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ESSAY 
The Constitutional Case for Chevron 
Deference 
Jonathan R. Siegel* 
Prominent figures in the legal world have recently attacked the 
doctrine of Chevron deference, suggesting that Chevron is 
unconstitutional because it interferes with a court’s duty to exercise 
“independent judgment” when interpreting statutes. This Essay shows 
that Chevron’s critics are mistaken. Chevron deference, properly 
understood, does not prevent courts from interpreting statutes. An 
interpretation that concludes that a statute delegates power to an 
executive agency is still an interpretation. The power implicitly 
delegated to an agency by an ambiguous statute is not the power to 
interpret the statute, but the power to make a policy choice within the 
limits set by the possible meanings of the statute.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
An icon of administrative law is under attack. Prominent figures 
in the legal world are attacking Chevron.1 The critics could hardly have 
gone after a bigger target. Chevron is the most-cited administrative law 
case of all time.2 Every law student who has taken a basic course in 
administrative law is familiar with the principle of “Chevron deference,” 
under which courts must defer to an executive agency’s reasonable 
 
 1. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2. Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and 
Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 (2014). According to Westlaw databases, federal 
courts of appeals have cited Chevron nearly five thousand times, as have federal district courts. 
Law review articles have cited the case more than eight thousand times. The Supreme Court itself 
has cited Chevron more than two hundred times. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling 
Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2225, 2227 (1997) (calling Chevron “one of the 
most important constitutional decisions in history”). 
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interpretation of an ambiguous provision of a statute the agency 
administers.3 
The current attack on Chevron does not merely suggest that 
courts should limit the case’s application. It is true that the Supreme 
Court has recently limited Chevron in various ways—it has, for 
example, limited the kinds of agency pronouncements that are entitled 
to deference,4 and it has declared that some matters are so momentous 
that Chevron does not apply to them.5 But the latest attack goes far 
beyond that. The latest claim is that the very concept of Chevron 
deference is unconstitutional. Judges, legislators, and scholars have 
suggested that the Constitution imposes a duty on courts to exercise 
“independent judgment” when interpreting a statute.6 This duty, 
Chevron’s critics say, derives from Article III’s vesting of the “judicial 
Power” in the courts, and it forbids courts from deferring to an agency’s 
interpretation.7 
This argument has been advanced at the highest levels of the 
judiciary. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas made the argument 
in two recent cases.8 He asserted that the judicial power “requires a 
court to exercise its independent judgment in interpreting and 
expounding upon the laws,” and that “Chevron deference precludes 
judges from exercising that judgment.”9 Justice Neil Gorsuch made the 
same argument during his time as a federal appellate judge. In a 
concurring opinion, then-Judge Gorsuch stated that “under 
Chevron, . . . courts are not fulfilling their duty to interpret the law.”10 
This duty, he asserted, is “likely compelled by the Constitution itself.”11 
Gorsuch was, of course, recently elevated to the Supreme Court,12 so 
now there are two Supreme Court Justices who have suggested that 
Chevron is unconstitutional. 
Members of Congress have made similar arguments. In the 
114th Congress, the House of Representatives passed the “Separation 
 
 3. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45. 
 4. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
 5. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). 
 6. See infra notes 8–23 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 8–23 and accompanying text. 
 8. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Perez v. Mortg. 
Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217, 1219, 1224 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 9. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712. 
 10. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Neil Gorsuch Is Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html 
[https://perma.cc/RQ9B-AEA4]. 
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of Powers Restoration Act” (“SOPRA”),13 which, if enacted, would have 
overruled Chevron statutorily. SOPRA would have required courts 
reviewing agency actions to decide all questions of law de novo.14 The 
House Report accompanying the bill suggested that Chevron is 
inconsistent with the principle of Marbury v. Madison that ‘‘[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say 
what the law is.’’15 The Report also states that Chevron “is difficult, if 
not impossible, to square with the Framers’ intent in the Constitution 
to create a government of definite, limited, and separated powers.”16 
SOPRA did not become law in the 114th Congress, but it has been 
reintroduced in the 115th Congress,17 and it has once again passed the 
House.18 
Finally, scholars have also chimed in. Most notably, Professor 
Philip Hamburger of Columbia Law School has argued that Chevron 
deference is unconstitutional.19 Like the other authorities cited above, 
Hamburger argues that Chevron unconstitutionally prevents judges 
from fulfilling their duty to exercise independent judgment when 
interpreting statutes.20 He also asserts that Chevron deference violates 
the Constitution’s Due Process Clause by requiring judges to exercise 
 
 13. H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 14. Id. § 2(3). 
 15. H.R. REP. NO. 114-622, at 4 (2016). 
 16. Id. at 5. 
 17. H.R. 76, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 18. In the 115th Congress, SOPRA passed the House as Title II of the Regulatory 
Accountability Act of 2017. See H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017). There appears to have been no House 
committee report accompanying the bill in the 115th Congress. 
 19. Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2016). Professor 
Hamburger’s work is the leading academic exposition of the current constitutional attack on 
Chevron. See also Charles J. Cooper, The Flaws of Chevron Deference, 21 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 307, 
310–11 (2016) (“Chevron is an impermissible abdication of judicial duty.”); Douglas H. Ginsburg & 
Steven Menashi, Our Illiberal Administrative State, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 475, 497–507 (2016) 
(attacking Chevron as contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that an attempt by 
Congress to enact Chevron doctrine by statute would raise “a serious constitutional question,” and 
stating that Chevron’s “wholesale transfer of legal interpretation from courts to agencies” violates 
“the most basic notion of judicial review that it is the province of the courts to say what the law 
is”); cf. Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign 
Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 823–24 (2011) (noting that Chevron deference is sometimes 
justified on the theory that ambiguous statutes represent a delegation of lawmaking power to 
agencies, but questioning whether this theory can justify judicial deference to executive 
interpretation of treaties and statutes in foreign relations law); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, 
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2131 (2002) (briefly suggesting 
that “Chevron may well be wrongly decided as a matter of constitutional law. Perhaps . . . de novo 
judicial review of federal questions is constitutionally required, so Chevron deference would be 
impermissible even if Congress explicitly enacted it”). For an analysis that puts the constitutional 
attack on Chevron in the context of the broader attack currently being made against the whole 
administrative state, see Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s 
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24–28, 31–33, 39–42 (2017). 
 20. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1209–10. 
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systematically biased judgment in favor of the government.21 Chevron, 
Hamburger concludes, involves such “clear violations of Article III and 
the Fifth Amendment”22 that judges who want to follow the decision 
should resign.23 
Thus, powerful figures in the legal world have suggested that a 
fundamental principle of administrative law is not merely incorrect but 
in fact violates the Constitution. These suggestions demand a response. 
This Essay makes the case for the constitutionality of Chevron 
deference.  
The first step of the argument was made long ago—indeed, 
before Chevron itself. In his classic article, Marbury and the 
Administrative State,24 Professor Henry Monaghan made the key 
observation that ambiguity in a statute entrusted to an administrative 
agency for enforcement is best understood as a delegation of power to 
the agency.25 A year later, Chevron endorsed this concept by holding 
that an ambiguous provision in an agency statute should be deemed to 
constitute an implicit delegation of power to the agency to fill the gap 
left by Congress.26 Thus, the most basic reason why agencies should 
have the power to resolve ambiguities in provisions of statutes they 
administer is that Congress should be understood to have delegated this 
power to agencies. 
This observation, however, does not end the debate. Fully aware 
of this argument, Chevron’s critics deny it. According to the critics, the 
Constitution vests courts with the power and duty “to say what the law 
is,” and no one, not even Congress, can transfer this power from the 
judiciary to the executive.27 Thus, even if Congress were to enact 
Chevron as an express, statutorily mandated rule of statutory 
construction, it would, the critics say, be unconstitutional and 
ineffective. 
This Essay argues that Chevron’s critics have misunderstood the 
limits of the judicial and legislative roles in the interpretation of 
statutes. Four points are key: First, even fully accepting the critics’ 
suggestion that courts must exercise independent judgment when 
construing a statute, sometimes the best construction of a statute is 
 
 21. Id. at 1211. 
 22. Id. at 1242. 
 23. Id. at 1248–49. 
 24. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
 25. Id. at 26; see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–73 (2001) (noting that 
Congress may not delegate legislative power to an agency but may delegate “decisionmaking 
authority”). 
 26. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
 27. E.g., Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1235. 
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that the statute vests discretion in the executive. Under this view, when 
a court interprets an administrative statute, finds it to be ambiguous, 
and defers to an agency’s reasonable construction of the statute, the 
court is fully exercising its power and duty to interpret the statute; it is 
simply doing so using a rule of statutory interpretation under which the 
correct interpretation of an ambiguity in an administrative statute is 
as an additional delegation of authority to the agency. In such a case, a 
court properly performs the judicial function by recognizing the 
discretion conferred by the statute. An interpretation that determines 
that a statute delegates power to the executive is still an 
interpretation.28 
Second, the first point does require a conceptual shift in the 
understanding of the kind of discretion conferred on an administrative 
agency by an ambiguous statute. It is often said—perhaps even in 
Chevron itself—that courts must treat an ambiguous agency statute as 
an implicit delegation to the agency of the power to interpret the 
statute.29 This understanding opens Chevron deference to the critique 
described above. To address the critique, courts must understand 
ambiguity in an agency statute a little differently. Courts should not 
infer that Congress has delegated the interpretive power to agencies. 
But where an agency statute is ambiguous, the court is to interpret the 
statute as creating a menu of permissible actions and delegating to the 
agency the power to choose among them.30 
Third, a different route to the same conclusion as the first two 
points is to recognize that policymaking power conferred by statutory 
ambiguity is no different than policymaking power conferred by express 
statutory language, which even the critics accept as permissible insofar 
as Article III is concerned. Congress expressly vests policymaking 
discretion in agencies all the time.31 
Finally, once these points are agreed, the only remaining 
difficulty is determining when a statute is best understood as conferring 
discretion on the executive. This is where the final point comes in: 
Congress may prescribe rules of interpretation for the statutes it 
passes. Like any giver of instructions, Congress may say how its 
instructions are to be understood. Congress could, therefore, provide 
that an ambiguous instruction to an agency is to be understood as 
 
 28. See infra Section II.C.1. 
 29. See infra notes 160–162 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra Section II.C.2. 
 31. See infra Section II.E. 
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vesting discretion in the agency to choose among the reasonably 
permissible interpretations of the instruction.32 
Part I of this Essay explains the Chevron deference principle and 
recounts the debate over it. Part II provides the response to Chevron’s 
critics. 
I. CHEVRON AND ITS CRITICS 
Chevron is so familiar that only a brief recital of its key points is 
necessary. This Part provides this brief background and then explains 
the critiques of Chevron that important figures have recently advanced. 
A. The Principle of Chevron Deference 
Courts reviewing actions by federal administrative agencies 
have long faced the question of what consideration to give to the 
agencies’ own interpretations of the statutes they administer. By 
necessity, agencies must interpret these statutes.33 The statutes tell the 
agencies what to do, so the agencies must interpret them to know what 
to do. Justiciability and administrative law principles normally ensure 
that a court will have an opportunity to encounter such a statute only 
after the agency has taken some action under it.34 Thus, by the time a 
court has occasion to construe a statute administered by a federal 
agency, the agency itself will typically have given some construction to 
the statute. 
For a long time, going back at least to the nineteenth century, 
federal courts gave “respectful consideration” or “great respect” to an 
agency’s contemporaneous construction of a statute that the agency 
administered.35 An agency’s construction was, however, “not 
controlling.”36 Final interpretive power rested with the courts, because 
“the judicial department has imposed upon it by the constitution, the 
solemn duty to interpret the laws, in the last resort; and . . . where [a 
 
 32. See infra Section II.E. 
 33. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 5. 
 34. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (holding that federal courts cannot give 
advisory opinions); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938) (“[N]o one 
is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative 
remedy has been exhausted.”). 
 35. E.g., Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 374, 382 (1874); United States v. Dickson, 40 
U.S. (15 Pet.) 141, 161 (1841). As early as 1827, the Supreme Court said, “In the construction of a 
doubtful and ambiguous law, the cotemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to 
act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very great 
respect,” Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827), although that case 
concerned the construction of a state statute by commissioners appointed to administer it. 
 36. Smythe, 90 U.S. at 382. 
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court’s] judgment shall differ from that of other high functionaries, it is 
not at liberty to surrender, or to waive [that duty].”37 Thus, where a 
court’s interpretation of a statute differed from that of the agency that 
administered the statute in the first instance, the court was empowered 
to enforce its own interpretation. 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the question of the 
degree of respect to be given by courts to an agency’s interpretation of 
a statute “produced a large number of statutory interpretation opinions 
that defy easy reconciliation.”38 Sometimes the Supreme Court stated 
that “the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution 
should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is 
wrong.”39 In other cases the Court said that the amount of deference a 
court should give to an agency’s interpretation of a statute “will depend 
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and 
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.”40 But as late as 1983—just a year before Chevron—the Court 
reiterated the view that an agency’s interpretation, though entitled to 
respect, was not controlling.41 
Chevron changed this rule. In Chevron, the Supreme Court held 
that when a court reviews a federal agency’s interpretation of a statute 
administered by the agency, the court must follow a two-step process. 
First, in “Chevron Step One,” the court must ask whether Congress has 
by statute clearly and directly addressed the precise question at issue. 
If so, both the court and the agency are bound by Congress’s clear 
statutory instructions.42 If, however, the governing statute is “silent or 
ambiguous” as to the specific question at issue, the court, applying 
“Chevron Step Two,” asks only whether the agency’s construction of the 
statute is “permissible.”43 In such a case, the reviewing court must 
uphold the agency’s construction provided it is a reasonable 
 
 37. Dickson, 40 U.S. at 162; see also Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840) 
(“If a suit should come before [this Court] which involved the construction of any of these laws . . . 
the Court certainly would not be bound to adopt the construction given by the head of a 
department.”). 
 38. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 453 (1989). 
 39. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). 
 40. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 41. Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 461 U.S. 624, 
635 (1983). 
 42. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). Chevron 
did not use the terms “Step One” and “Step Two.” Those terms later became common through use 
by lower courts and commentators. See, e.g., Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 441 
(D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 43. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
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interpretation of the statute, even if it is not what the court regards as 
the best interpretation.44 The statutory ambiguity is to be regarded as 
an implicit delegation to the agency of the power to “elucidate” the 
statute.45 
Thus was born the doctrine of “Chevron deference.” The doctrine 
has many nuances that the Supreme Court elaborated in subsequent 
cases. For example, the Court has considered (and sometimes changed 
its mind about) issues such as whether judicial deference varies 
depending on whether the agency has maintained a consistent 
interpretation or has changed its interpretation over time,46 and how 
the deference principle operates when an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute differs from a prior judicial interpretation.47 The Court has also 
determined that Chevron deference does not apply to every agency 
interpretation of a statute the agency administers. The structure of 
deference, the Court has held, varies depending on the process the 
agency used to come up with its interpretation.48 In addition, the Court 
has determined that some matters are so momentous that the principle 
of Chevron deference does not apply to them, because the principle is 
grounded in the assumption that statutory ambiguity represents an 
implicit delegation of power to an agency, and some matters are so 
important that a court could not believe that Congress delegated them 
to an agency for decision.49 These determinations that the structure of 
 
 44. Id. at 843 n.11, 844. 
 45. Id. at 844. 
 46. Compare Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 
(2005) (“Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation 
under the Chevron framework.”), with Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993) 
(“[T]he consistency of an agency’s position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due.”). 
Cf. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016) (declining to defer to an 
agency’s changed position because the agency had not adequately explained the reason for the 
change). 
 47. Compare Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982 (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute 
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court 
decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus 
leaves no room for agency discretion.”), with Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536–37 (1992) 
(“Once we have determined a statute’s clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the 
doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against our 
prior determination of the statute’s meaning.” (quoting Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, 
Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990))). 
 48. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (noting that Chevron deference 
applies only “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make 
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority”). 
 49. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). Some scholars have understood decisions discussed in this 
paragraph as signaling a more general judicial concern about the administrative state. E.g., 
Metzger, supra note 19, at 28 (stating that King and other decisions “contribute to the sense of a 
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Chevron deference does not always apply have given rise to what is 
sometimes called “Chevron Step Zero,” an initial step in which a court 
must determine whether the other two steps apply.50 
Chevron has also spawned an enormous scholarly literature that 
has investigated innumerable aspects of the decision. Scholars have, for 
example, debated whether Chevron actually changed the way courts 
review agency statutory interpretation,51 investigated the Step Zero 
question of when Chevron applies,52 and studied Chevron’s impact 
empirically.53 
But for purposes of this Essay, these many nuances and 
subsidiary issues are of no consequence. Chevron’s current critics do not 
challenge mere details of the doctrine. They challenge its fundamental 
essence. The critics assert that the very concept of Chevron deference is 
unconstitutional. They claim that where a court’s best understanding 
of a statute, based on the court’s independent judgment, differs from 
the construction placed on the statute by an administrative agency, the 
Constitution requires the court to enforce its own interpretation and 
prohibits it from deferring to the agency’s, even if the agency’s 
construction is a “permissible” or “reasonable” interpretation of the 
statute. 
B. Chevron Attacked 
As noted in the Introduction, Chevron’s critics include extremely 
important figures in the legal world. Supreme Court Justices, members 
 
growing judicial resistance to administrative governance and judicial concern over the 
constitutional legitimacy of the administrative state”). 
 50. See, e.g., Or. Rest. & Lodging Ass’n v. Perez, 816 F.3d 1080, 1086 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(discussing “Chevron step zero”); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (introducing discussion of “Chevron step zero” doctrine); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006). 
 51. Compare Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 1253, 1257–58 (1997) (“[E]xperience has not borne out the early predictions of a sea 
change in judicial deference. A strong revisionist view has emerged, interpreting Chevron as less 
deferential than many initially assumed.”), and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of 
Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 93 (2011) (“There is no empirical 
support for the widespread belief that choice of doctrine plays a major role in judicial review of 
agency actions.”), with Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON 
REG. 283, 284 (1986) (“Chevron has quickly become a decision of great importance . . . .”). 
 52. E.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 50.  
 53. E.g., Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. 
REV. 1 (2017); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 
(2008); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An 
Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727 
(2010). 
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of Congress, and noted scholars have all joined in. For the purposes of 
this Essay, the members of this group will be dubbed “the critics.” 
1. Justice Thomas 
Justice Thomas laid the groundwork for his attack on Chevron 
in the case of Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n.54 The case was not 
actually about Chevron deference; it concerned interpretation of agency 
rules, whereas Chevron is about interpretation of statutes.55 
Nonetheless, Justice Thomas’s lengthy concurring opinion, which 
expressed concern about “protecting the structure of the 
Constitution,”56 explored some themes related to the Chevron debate. 
In particular, Justice Thomas noted that under the Seminole Rock 
doctrine, courts give deference to an agency’s interpretation of one of its 
own rules, provided the interpretation is not plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the rule it interprets.57 Justice Thomas expressed 
concern about the way the Court’s “steady march toward deference” 
risked “compromising our constitutional structure.”58 
The Framers, Justice Thomas explained, relied on separation of 
powers to secure liberty.59 The Framers assigned the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers to separate bodies designed to act as 
checks upon each other.60 Judicial deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of the agency’s own regulations, Justice Thomas said, 
“amounts to an erosion of the judicial obligation to serve as a ‘check’ on 
the political branches.”61 
 
 54. 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213–25 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). The attack goes 
back earlier than that, but Perez brought it into the limelight.  
 55. The main point of Perez was the “Paralyzed Veterans doctrine,” a creation of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. 
Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“This case involves just the proper interpretation 
of the regulation.”). Under this doctrine, an agency desiring to interpret one of its own legislative 
rules could issue an initial “interpretive” rule without using notice-and-comment rulemaking, but 
once the agency had done so, it had to use notice and comment to issue any subsequent interpretive 
rule changing its initial interpretation. Id. at 586; see also Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 
F.3d 1030, 1033–34 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine with approval). In 
Perez, the Supreme Court rejected the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine. It held that the doctrine was 
incompatible with the Administrative Procedure Act’s exemption of interpretive rules from the 
notice-and-comment process. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1206–07. 
 56. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1215 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 57. Id. at 1213; see Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417 (1945) (relying on 
agency’s interpretation of its regulation). 
 58. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1214–15. 
 59. Id. at 1216. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1217. 
Siegel_Galley (Do Not Delete) 4/13/2018  9:16 AM 
948 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:3:937 
The Constitution’s assignment of the judicial power to the 
courts, Justice Thomas argued, “requires a court to exercise its 
independent judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.”62 
The Framers knew that laws would often be ambiguous, and “[t]he 
judicial power was understood to include the power to resolve these 
ambiguities over time.”63 The Constitution insulates judges from 
pressures that might bias them so as to protect the courts’ ability to 
exercise independent judgment.64 The judiciary, Justice Thomas 
concluded, “is duty bound to exercise independent judgment in applying 
the law.”65 
For these reasons, Justice Thomas criticized Seminole Rock 
deference.66 Such deference, he argued, “amounts to a transfer of the 
judge’s exercise of interpretive judgment to the agency.”67 Deference 
also “undermines the judicial ‘check’ on the political branches.”68 Not 
even Congress, Justice Thomas asserted, could empower agencies to 
interpret their own regulations and require courts to defer to their 
interpretations, because the Constitution assigns the power to issue 
judicially binding interpretations of law to the courts, not to Congress. 
“Lacking the power itself, [Congress] cannot delegate that power to an 
agency.”69 
Justice Thomas had no occasion in Perez to consider the 
appropriateness of Chevron deference, as opposed to Seminole Rock 
deference. But the occasion soon arose. Three months after Perez, the 
Supreme Court decided Michigan v. EPA,70 in which the Court applied 
Chevron in the course of striking down an EPA rule.71 Justice Thomas 
again wrote a concurring opinion. Applying the principles he had laid 
out in Perez, he questioned the constitutionality of Chevron deference.72 
 
 62. Id. (emphasis added). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1217–19. 
 65. Id. at 1219. 
 66. Id. at 1217–25. 
 67. Id. at 1219. 
 68. Id. at 1220. 
 69. Id. at 1224. 
 70. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 71. Michigan concerned the EPA’s interpretation of a statutory requirement that it regulate 
certain emissions from power plants only if doing so was “appropriate and necessary.” Id. at 2704. 
The EPA decided that it could determine whether regulating the emissions was “appropriate and 
necessary” without considering regulatory costs. Id. at 2705–06. The Supreme Court rejected the 
EPA’s interpretation of “appropriate and necessary.” Id. at 2711–12. The Court held that, even 
applying the principle of Chevron deference, the agency’s decision was not “within the bounds of 
reasonable interpretation.” Id. at 2706–07, 2712 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. 
Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014). 
 72. Id. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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He reiterated that the Constitution’s assignment of the judicial power 
to the courts requires courts to exercise “independent judgment” when 
interpreting the laws.73 Chevron deference, he noted, precludes courts 
from doing so. Therefore, Chevron deference transfers the judicial 
power to “say what the law is” from the judiciary to the executive—a 
transfer that, Justice Thomas argued, is “in tension with” the Vesting 
Clause of Article III.74 
Justice Thomas acknowledged that the Article III problem might 
be ameliorated by regarding an agency’s act of interpreting a statute it 
administers as “formulation of policy” rather than as “interpretation.”75 
However, Justice Thomas argued, conceiving the agency’s action that 
way merely trades one constitutional problem for another. Although it 
might solve the Article III problem, it creates an Article I problem, for 
Article I vests Congress, not the executive, with the legislative power.76 
Either way, Justice Thomas concluded, the Court has strayed “further 
and further from the Constitution.”77 
Thus, Justice Thomas has strongly criticized Chevron deference, 
suggesting that the doctrine is not merely erroneous but 
unconstitutional. Justice Thomas’s views regarding Chevron are in 
keeping with his role as the Justice most willing to question whether 
fundamental, long-standing doctrines are in keeping with originalist 
constitutional principles.78 Moreover, with regard to Chevron, Justice 
Thomas has important allies, starting with his newest colleague, 
Justice Gorsuch. 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 75. Id. at 2712–13. 
 76. Id. at 2713. 
 77. Id. at 2714. 
 78. For example, in a landmark case about the meaning of the Constitution’s Commerce 
Clause, Justice Thomas wrote a solo concurrence expressing interest in reviving the purported 
original understanding of the distinction between “commerce” and manufacturing, mining, and 
agriculture. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584–88, 598 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
Justice Thomas stated that the Court should reconsider the Commerce Clause “without totally 
rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence,” thus making unclear how far he would 
go in this direction. Id. at 585. However, his suggestion, if adopted, could call into question the 
constitutionality of an enormous portion of the federal government’s business. Similarly, he has 
long been the Justice most willing to suggest the need for significantly strengthening the 
nondelegation doctrine. E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (solo concurrence) (“On a future day . . . I would be willing to address the question 
whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders’ understanding of 
separation of powers.”). Again, this view, if adopted, could have enormous impact on the 
constitutionality of much of the federal government’s operations.  
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2. Justice Gorsuch 
Justice Gorsuch expressed his views on Chevron when he was a 
judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in the case of 
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch.79 The case concerned an immigration law 
issue, the precise details of which are unimportant here, and the 
administrative law principle of Brand X, which allows an agency to 
“overrule” a judicial opinion by issuing a new, reasonable interpretation 
of a statute it administers, even if that interpretation differs from a 
prior judicial interpretation.80 Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the court 
addressed the Brand X issues raised by the case.81 
Justice Gorsuch then took the unusual step of writing a 
concurrence to his own opinion.82 Like Justice Thomas’s opinions in 
Perez and Michigan, Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence raised larger 
questions about the impact of deference doctrines on the separation of 
powers. Chevron and Brand X, Justice Gorsuch complained, “permit 
executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and 
legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems 
more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the 
framers’ design.”83 Reaching back to the foundational case of Marbury 
v. Madison, Justice Gorsuch pointed out that under that case, 
resolution of questions of private legal rights is a judicial function.84 
Chevron, he said, “seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the 
abdication of the judicial duty.”85 
Justice Gorsuch did not quote Marbury’s famous statement that 
“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is,”86 but he alluded to it implicitly. Under Chevron, 
he observed, courts decide whether an agency statute is ambiguous and 
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.87 But, he plaintively 
 
 79. 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016). For simplicity, and to avoid constant repetition of the 
awkward phrase “then-Judge Gorsuch,” Justice Gorsuch is referred to as “Justice Gorsuch” in the 
description of this case, even though he was an appellate judge at the time. 
 80. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–84 (2005). 
 81. Gutierrez-Brizuela asked whether, when an agency issues a new interpretation of a 
statute that contradicts a prior judicial interpretation, the agency may apply its new interpretation 
retroactively to transactions that occurred when the contrary judicial interpretation apparently 
controlled. 834 F.3d at 1143–44. Justice Gorsuch, writing for the court, expressed some distaste 
for Brand X, see id. at 1143 (suggesting that the doctrine is out of step with “our constitutional 
history”), but determined that even accepting it, retroactive application of the new agency 
interpretation was not permitted. Id. at 1148. 
 82. Id. at 1149–58 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 83. Id. at 1149. 
 84. Id. at 1151 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 167 (1803)). 
 85. Id. at 1152. 
 86. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. 
 87. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152. 
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asked, “where in all this does a court interpret the law and say what it 
is?”88 
Thus, like Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch regarded Chevron 
deference as incompatible with the Article III duty of courts to interpret 
the law. Also like Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch argued that 
although the Article III problem might be ameliorated by positing that 
when an agency gives content to an ambiguous statute, it is not 
“interpreting” the statute but rather exercising delegated power to 
make policy, such a solution raises a delegation problem. So regarded, 
Chevron might not violate Article III, but it would likely violate Article 
I.89 
Justice Gorsuch’s views were already of some interest when he 
expressed them as a Tenth Circuit judge. But now that he is a Supreme 
Court Justice, that interest is greatly increased. Two Supreme Court 
Justices have now questioned one of the cornerstones of administrative 
law. 
3. Congress 
The attacks on Chevron are not coming solely from the judiciary. 
Some members of Congress share the view that Chevron deference is 
illegitimate. These members are trying to overturn Chevron statutorily 
by passing SOPRA, the Separation of Powers Restoration Act. This bill, 
which passed the House of Representatives in both the 114th and 115th 
Congresses,90 would amend § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Currently, that section simply provides that a reviewing court “shall 
decide all relevant questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions.” Under the proposed amendment, the section 
would more elaborately provide: 
The reviewing court shall . . . decide de novo all relevant questions of law, including the 
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, and rules made by agencies. If 
the reviewing court determines that a statutory or regulatory provision relevant to its 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1152–56. 
 90. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text. SOPRA passed the House on votes that 
ran almost completely along party lines. See 162 CONG. REC. H4694–95 (daily ed. July 12, 2016); 
Final Vote Results for Roll Call 416, HOUSE CLERK (vote recorded July 12, 2016, 4:30 PM), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2016/roll416.xml [https://perma.cc/BRR4-G8R8] (showing that SOPRA 
passed the House in the 114th Congress with 239 Republican and 1 Democratic vote in favor, and 
171 Democratic votes against); 163 CONG. REC. H371–72 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 2017); Final Vote 
Results for Roll Call 45, HOUSE CLERK (vote recorded Jan. 11, 2017, 6:46 PM), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll045.xml [https://perma.cc/9TC7-YN7E] (showing that the bill of 
which SOPRA was a part passed the House in the 115th Congress with 233 Republican and 5 
Democratic votes in favor, and 183 Democratic votes against). This suggests that SOPRA has not 
become law because it lacks the votes to overcome a Democratic filibuster in the Senate. 
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decision contains a gap or ambiguity, the court shall not interpret that gap or ambiguity 
as an implicit delegation to the agency of legislative rule making authority and shall not 
rely on such gap or ambiguity as a justification either for interpreting agency authority 
expansively or for deferring to the agency’s interpretation on the question of law.91  
Thus, under the proposed amendment, § 706 would make clear 
that a reviewing court must interpret statutes de novo and must not 
give deference to agency interpretations. 
The stated motivation behind SOPRA echoes the opinions of 
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch described above. The House Report on 
SOPRA in the 114th Congress suggested that Chevron deference is 
inconsistent with the judicial duty, declared in Marbury v. Madison, to 
“say what the law is.”92 The idea that an ambiguity in an agency statute 
represents an implicit delegation to the agency of power to determine 
what the ambiguous terms mean is, the report said, “difficult, if not 
impossible, to square with” the separation of powers,93 for if the 
Constitution assigns the interpretive power to the judicial branch, then 
Congress cannot reassign that power to the executive branch.94 
4. Scholars 
Finally, scholars have weighed in on the debate over Chevron’s 
constitutionality.95 Most notably, Professor Philip Hamburger of 
Columbia recently published an article strongly attacking Chevron.96 
Hamburger’s administrative law work is central to the debate and, 
indeed, was a precursor to the judicial criticisms of Chevron discussed 
above. Both Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch relied on Hamburger’s 
earlier work in their opinions questioning Chevron deference.97 
Hamburger asserts that Chevron deference is unconstitutional 
for two reasons. First, like the Justices discussed above, Hamburger 
argues that Chevron deference is incompatible with the judicial duty, 
imposed by Article III of the Constitution, to exercise independent 
judgment when addressing questions of law.98 Hamburger relies 
heavily on the view that judges hold an “office,” specifically, “an office 
 
 91. H.R. 5, 115th Cong. § 202 (2017) (engrossed in House, Jan. 11, 2017). 
 92. H.R. REP. NO. 114-622, at 4 (2016). 
 93. Id. at 4–5. 
 94. Id. at 5. 
 95. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 96. Hamburger, supra note 19. 
 97. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1218 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(citing PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 507, 508 (2008)); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 
834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 287–91 (2014)). The opinions cited Professor Hamburger’s 
books, not the more recent article discussed here.  
 98. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1206–1210. 
Siegel_Galley(Do Not Delete) 4/13/2018  9:16 AM 
2018] THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR CHEVRON 953 
of judgment, in which they must exercise their own independent 
judgment.”99 According to Hamburger, “the office or duty of a judge to 
exercise his independent judgment was the very identity of a judge,” 
and a judge “therefore cannot defer to the judgment of an 
administrative agency without abandoning his office as a judge.”100 The 
conventional notion that Congress delegates interpretive authority to 
administrative agencies is, Hamburger asserts, irrelevant. Even if 
Congress has delegated such authority to agencies, the delegation is 
ineffective, because Congress cannot displace a judge’s constitutional 
duty to exercise independent judgment.101 
Hamburger’s other argument is that Chevron’s requirement that 
courts defer to agency interpretations of statutes they administer 
necessarily produces “systematically biased judgment.”102 Agencies are 
often (though not always) parties in cases in which their interpretations 
are judicially reviewed, and in such cases Chevron requires courts to 
defer to the views of a party to the case before them.103 We would, 
Hamburger observes, ordinarily regard judicial deference to a party as 
outrageous.104 The bias produced by Chevron is no different, 
Hamburger argues, and it constitutes a “brazen violation” of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.105 
For these reasons, Hamburger argues that Chevron deference is 
unconstitutional. Hamburger, indeed, concludes that Chevron 
deference is “one of the most dramatic departures from the ideals of 
judicial office and due process in the history of the common law,”106 and 
that if judges “do not want to exercise their own independent judgment, 
but instead want to exercise systematic bias, they should resign.”107 
This prescription would likely require a very substantial number of 
inferior federal judges to resign, but in Hamburger’s view the “most 
basic requirements” of judging include “avoid[ing] systematic bias” and 
“exercis[ing] . . . independent judgment,” and judges “unwilling to 
 
 99. Id. at 1206. 
 100. Id. at 1209. 
 101. See id. at 1213; cf. Ginsburg & Menashi, supra note 19, at 499, 507 (recognizing that a 
statute mandating a court to accede to the interpretation of an agency rather than its own 
independent judgment “would be controversial, to say the least”); Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 
2131 (contemplating that “perhaps de novo judicial review of federal questions is constitutionally 
required, so Chevron deference would be impermissible even if Congress explicitly enacted it”). 
 102. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1211. 
 103. Id. at 1211–12. 
 104. Id. at 1212. 
 105. Id. at 1212–13. 
 106. Id. at 1247. 
 107. Id. at 1248. 
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adhere” to these requirements “have no business pretending to be 
judges and should get off the bench.”108 
Among academics, the other leading challenge to Chevron’s 
constitutionality is a much earlier work by Professor Cynthia Farina of 
Cornell.109 Unlike the current critics, Farina does not see Chevron 
deference as a violation of Article III. She suggests instead that Chevron 
threatens to violate the nondelegation doctrine, although her point is 
somewhat different from that of the current critics. The essence of 
Farina’s argument is that in Chevron the Supreme Court failed to 
consider whether the assumption that every ambiguity in an agency 
statute constitutes an implicit delegation of power to the agency would 
contribute to the ever-increasing accumulation of power in the 
president in a way that threatens the balance of powers among the 
three branches of government. Farina observes that the nondelegation 
doctrine was originally understood to prohibit any delegation of the 
legislative power. In early cases, apparent delegations were approved 
on the basis that they delegated “nonlegislative” power such as the 
power to find the facts from which statutory consequences flowed.110 
Over time, however, the Supreme Court began to approve delegations 
on the different basis that delegation of legislative power is permitted 
provided Congress lays down the “intelligible principle” by which the 
power is to be exercised,111 and ultimately the test became whether the 
statutory standards were sufficiently precise that a court could say 
whether they were being obeyed.112 
Thus, Farina says, the Court permitted legislative power to be 
statutorily delegated so long as it would be adequately controlled, and 
a “crucial aspect” of such control “was judicial policing of the terms of 
the statute.”113 As Farina sees it, nondelegation cases reached a 
“constitutional accommodation,” and that accommodation “implied that 
principal power to say what the statute means must rest outside the 
agency, in the courts.”114 Chevron, Farina suggests, is “fundamentally 
incongruous” with this constitutional accommodation that approved 
delegations of so much power to agencies.115 
Moreover, Farina suggests, Chevron’s deference principle must 
be evaluated in the context of the overall balance of powers. The 
 
 108. Id. at 1249. 
 109. Farina, supra note 38. 
 110. Id. at 480–82. 
 111. Id. at 483–84. 
 112. Id. at 485. 
 113. Id. at 487. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 487–88, 497–98. 
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Constitution’s Framers, fearful of legislative tyranny, imposed 
stringent controls on the exercise of legislative power,116 but they 
created less constraint on the executive power, so that the executive 
could act with necessary “dispatch, coordination, initiative, and 
consistency.”117 As a result, while Congress enjoys “legislative 
supremacy” and theoretically has power to control and reverse almost 
any agency decision, the president has far more practical power to 
control agencies.118 Chevron deference therefore contributes to a 
dangerous accumulation of power in a single branch, namely, the 
executive.119 
Farina’s critique of Chevron is sufficiently distinct from those of 
the others discussed above that when this Essay refers to Chevron’s 
“critics” without qualification, she is not included. Her arguments will 
be addressed separately.120 The “critics” are Justices Thomas and 
Gorsuch, Professor Hamburger, and the members of Congress 
supporting SOPRA. 
II. CHEVRON DEFENDED 
Chevron’s critics are demanding nothing less than a revolution 
in administrative law. Chevron has been a mainstay of the field for over 
thirty years.121 The critics do not wish to alter the details of Chevron 
doctrine. They propose no subtle refinement of Chevron’s Step One or 
Step Two or Step Zero. They want the very concept of Chevron deference 
declared unconstitutional. 
Of course, a determination that Chevron is unconstitutional 
would be somewhat surprising, because it would have to come from the 
very body that adopted Chevron in the first place, the Supreme Court 
itself.122 And Chevron was unanimous, too.123 But it would not be the 
 
 116. Id. at 508. 
 117. Id. at 507. 
 118. Id. at 510. 
 119. Id. at 525–28. 
 120. See infra Section II.F.4. 
 121. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 122. Congress could certainly overturn Chevron statutorily, by passing SOPRA. The Supreme 
Court has never suggested that the principle of Chevron is constitutionally compelled. Rather, the 
Court has justified Chevron as an understanding of Congress’s intent in passing an ambiguous 
agency statute. E.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
Therefore, Congress could overturn Chevron by statutorily negating its supposed intent, which is 
what SOPRA would do. Cf. Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 2129 (agreeing that Congress could 
overturn Chevron by statute). But Congress could not hold Chevron unconstitutional—only the 
Supreme Court could do that. 
 123. See 467 U.S. at 839. Only six of the nine Justices participated in Chevron, see id., but all 
the participating Justices joined in the opinion, and the other three subsequently joined opinions 
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first time the Supreme Court struck down one of its own doctrines as 
unconstitutional. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,124 the Supreme Court said 
that it was overruling the prior doctrine of Swift v. Tyson125 because 
“the unconstitutionality of [that doctrine] has now been made clear.”126 
So a confession of constitutional error from the Court is possible. 
It is therefore vitally important to respond to the critique of 
Chevron deference. The key insight is that even when a court interprets 
a legal directive de novo, the court may discover that the best 
construction of the directive is that it vests decisionmaking power in 
some other body. In such a case, the court fulfills its judicial duty by 
accepting the determination of the other body, provided that 
determination is within the power vested in that body. The court in such 
a case does not shirk its duty to construe the legal directive de novo; 
rather, the court, having fulfilled its duty, finds that the governing law 
requires it to accept the other body’s exercise of the discretion vested in 
it.127  
A. Clearing Away the Underbrush 
Before turning to the main argument, it is important to clarify 
two points. One is a point of potential confusion about terminology. The 
other sets the terms of the debate. 
1.  The Meaning of “Interpret” 
When asking where the Constitution vests the power to 
interpret statutes, one must distinguish between two possible meanings 
of the term “interpret.” On the one hand, the usual meaning of 
“interpret” is “to explain or tell the meaning of.”128 In this sense, an 
agency interprets a statute whenever it reads the statute and 
determines what the statute means so that it may apply the statute. 
This Essay will refer to this sense of “interpret” as the “simple sense” of 
the word.  
On the other hand, in discussions of Chevron deference, 
“interpret” is also used in a more technical sense, which might be 
 
applying the Chevron deference principle. E.g., Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 980 
(1986). 
 124. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 125. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 126. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77–78. 
 127. See infra Sections II.B–C. 
 128. This is the first definition of “interpret” given by Merriam-Webster. See Interpret, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interpret (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/T2RT-2PFE]. 
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rendered as “to give definitive or controlling meaning to.” In this sense, 
asking whether Congress has given an agency the power to interpret a 
statute is asking whether Congress has authorized the agency to 
definitively resolve ambiguities in the statute, with the consequence 
that a court must uphold the agency’s interpretation even if it does not 
match the interpretation the court would give to the statute on its 
own.129 This Essay will refer to this meaning of “interpret” as the 
“strong sense” of the word. 
There can be no question that executive agencies are authorized 
to interpret statutes they administer in the simple sense of determining 
what the statutes mean. Indeed, agencies are obliged to do so. After all, 
statutes tell agencies what to do. An agency must interpret the statutes 
it administers so that it can know how to act under them.130 Even when 
the meaning of a statute is perfectly clear, an agency is still interpreting 
the statute when it looks at the ink marks that make up the statutory 
text, understands those ink marks as letters, the letters as words, and 
the words as having meaning. Every act of reading a statute and 
applying it is necessarily an act of interpretation. 
Moreover, where the statute is ambiguous, it is still incumbent 
upon the agency to interpret the statute in the simple sense of making 
a determination of the statute’s meaning. Again, the agency must 
determine the meaning of the statute in order to know what to do as it 
applies the statute. It would not be practical for an agency to run to a 
court every time it needed to resolve an ambiguity in a statute it 
administered, and besides, even if the agency wanted to do so, 
principles of justiciability would prevent the court from providing 
advice to the agency about the statute’s meaning outside the context of 
a particular case.131 
Thus, there can be no doubt that agencies can, and indeed must, 
interpret the statutes they administer, in the simple sense of the word 
“interpret.” This point is not controversial. Even Chevron’s critics 
recognize that “other branches of Government have the authority and 
obligation to interpret the law.”132 
 
 129. Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11 (1984). Of 
course, even under Chevron, the agency cannot give the statute a meaning that contradicts what 
a court determines to be the clear meaning of the statute; nor can it give the statute a meaning 
that a court determines to be unreasonable. But Chevron does empower agencies to resolve 
ambiguities in statutes in reasonable ways that a court must accept even if the court regards 
another interpretation as better. This is the power to interpret in the “strong sense.” 
 130. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 5. 
 131. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
 132. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); see 
also Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1196 (“[A]gencies must interpret to figure out how to act without 
violating the law.”). 
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So what is the argument about? When the critics debate who 
may interpret the law, they are using the word “interpret” in the strong 
sense. Thus, for example, Hamburger in many places discusses what he 
perceives as the irrelevance of “whether Congress authorizes agencies 
to interpret.”133 But he cannot be discussing whether Congress has 
authorized agencies to interpret statutes in the simple sense, because 
agencies always, necessarily, have that power. He is discussing whether 
Congress has authorized an agency to give a definitive interpretation to 
statutes it administers. 
The real question, therefore, is this: When an agency and a court 
have both undertaken to interpret a statute, in the simple sense, but 
the interpretations are different, whose interpretation controls?134 
Under Chevron, if the statute is ambiguous and the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable, a reviewing court must uphold it even if 
the court believes it is not the best interpretation.135 Chevron’s critics, 
however, believe that a court reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute must apply independent judgment and must enforce what the 
court believes to be the best interpretation of the statute.136 The critics 
sometimes express this point by saying that the question is whether the 
agency should have power to interpret a statute,137 but when they do, 
“interpret” must be understood in its strong sense. Everyone agrees 
that agencies have power to interpret statutes they administer in the 
simple sense. 
2. The Implication of the Critics’ Constitutional Claim 
It is also important to note an implication of the fact that the 
critics are claiming that Chevron is not merely incorrect, but 
unconstitutional. The critics do not merely claim that Congress has not 
created a regime of Chevron deference, but that Congress could not 
create a regime of Chevron deference.138 To be sure, some of the critics 
also make the former point—they question whether Chevron was 
correct as a matter of statutory interpretation.139 But this Essay 
primarily addresses the critics’ claim that Chevron is unconstitutional.  
 
 133. E.g., Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1197. 
 134. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 5 (noting that this is the “precise problem” (emphasis 
removed)). 
 135. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11 (1984). 
 136. E.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Hamburger, 
supra note 19, at 1205–10. 
 137. E.g., Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1222. 
 138. E.g., id. at 1197. 
 139. E.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring); Farina, supra note 38, at 468–76. For the response, see infra Section II.F.2. 
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To refute the critics on this point, one need not show that 
Chevron is a correct understanding of actual congressional desires, but 
only that Congress could, if it wanted to, make Chevron the law. That 
is, in responding to the critics, one is entitled to hypothesize that 
Congress passes a statute expressly mandating a regime of Chevron 
deference. 
Imagine, therefore, that Congress does just that. Suppose that 
Congress passes a statute—call it the “Chevron Implementation Act” or 
“CIA” (it always helps if a statute has a memorable acronym)—
expressly mandating that courts apply the principles of Chevron 
deference when reviewing agency action.140 Precise language for the 
CIA will be suggested below—for reasons that will become clear, the 
statute needs to be worded a particular way.141 For now, just think of 
the statute as mandating Chevron. The critics say that such a statute 
would be unconstitutional.142 To refute the critics, therefore, one need 
only show that the statute would be constitutional. 
B.  The Essence of the Argument 
In responding to Chevron’s critics, this Essay begins by 
conceding some of the key assertions in their arguments. Let it be 
assumed that the critics are correct that there is a judicial duty to 
exercise “independent judgment.” Assume that this duty is 
constitutionally based and cannot be displaced even by Congress. 
Assume also that this duty requires judges to conduct de novo review of 
interpretations given to legal instruments by the other branches of 
government. One might challenge these assumptions—other scholars 
have suggested that the judicial power, as originally understood, did 
not invariably require courts to enforce their own, de novo 
understanding of the meaning of legal texts143—but the point of this 
 
 140. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 5. Monaghan hypothesizes that Congress enacts a 
“reverse Bumpers amendment.” Id. The “Bumpers amendment,” which was never enacted, was 
the SOPRA of its day. See id. at 2. 
 141. See infra Section II.E. 
 142. E.g., Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1197. 
 143. Monaghan, for example, devotes a section to examining Thayer’s famous suggestion that 
courts should strike a statute down as unconstitutional only when the statute clearly violates the 
Constitution. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 7–11 (citing James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and 
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893)). Courts, Thayer 
suggested, should not interpret the Constitution de novo. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin 
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). Rather 
than simply enforcing “their own judgment” on constitutionality, courts should also consider “what 
judgment is permissible to another department which the constitution has charged with the duty 
of making it.” Id. In other words, Thayer suggested that courts should give deference to Congress’s 
interpretation of the Constitution in close cases. Monaghan says that the existence of judicial 
review “demands nothing with respect to the scope of judicial review” and that “the judicial duty 
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Essay is to demonstrate that the Article III critique of Chevron 
deference is mistaken even if one cedes these points to the critics. 
The first step in the response to the critics is simple and not new. 
Monaghan published the core insight in 1983, before Chevron was 
decided, and it was not new even then. As Monaghan acknowledged, 
others had expressed the same idea in works going back as early as 
1944.144 
The core insight, as Monaghan expresses it, is that “[j]udicial 
deference to agency ‘interpretation’ of law is simply one way of 
recognizing a delegation of law-making authority to an agency.”145 That 
is, an ambiguous agency statute is simply another way of doing 
something that Congress does all the time—namely, authorize an 
agency to make a policy choice. Innumerable statutes expressly 
authorize agencies to make decisions and prescribe rules that have the 
force and effect of law,146 and such authorization is routinely approved 
as constitutional.147 
 
‘to say what the law is’ does not demand an independent judgment rule; it is in fact quite consistent 
with a clear-mistake standard.” Monaghan, supra note 24, at 9. Gillian Metzger similarly suggests 
that there are “substantial arguments” that Article III does not “compel independent judicial 
judgment for all questions of statutory interpretation.” Metzger, supra note 19, at 41. 
 Aditya Bamzai suggests that early decisions employed a kind of “deference” principle, but one 
different from modern Chevron deference: he suggests that early decisions reflect a practice of 
giving judicial respect to a contemporaneous or customary construction of a legal text, which is not 
necessarily the same as the executive branch construction. Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial 
Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908, 941, 944, 987 (2017). Under this practice, 
Bamzai suggests, “a court would ‘respect’—or, to use modern parlance, ‘defer to’—an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute if and only if that interpretation reflected a customary or 
contemporaneous practice under the statute.” Id. at 987.  
 Thus, some might suggest that the critics are mistaken in their assertion that judges must 
exercise independent judgment. The critics would of course respond; Hamburger, for example, 
suggests that what Thayer regarded as a principle of deference is better understood as the 
substantive measure of whether a law contradicted a higher law. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 
1218–19. Therefore, Hamburger suggests, a judge who employed Thayer’s practice of failing to 
strike down a law unless the law were manifestly contrary to the Constitution would not be 
“deferring” to the legislative judgment that the law is constitutional, and hence the Thayerian 
view cannot justify judicial deference to administrative interpretation. Id. 
 In any event, this Essay does not engage this debate. It simply cedes this point to the critics.  
 144. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 27. 
 145. Id. at 26 (emphasis in original). Lest anyone miss the significance of this point, Monaghan 
put the whole sentence in italics. See id. 
 146. For just one out of an enormous possible number of examples, see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) 
(making it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] 
Commission may prescribe . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 147. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473–74 (2001) (approving 
statutory command that the EPA choose “ambient air quality standards” that are “requisite to 
protect the public health” and noting that the Court has only ever struck down two statutes on 
nondelegation doctrine grounds). 
Siegel_Galley(Do Not Delete) 4/13/2018  9:16 AM 
2018] THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR CHEVRON 961 
If Congress can delegate power to administrative agencies to 
make policy decisions, the precise form that the delegation takes should 
be of little importance. What should matter is the power delegated, not 
the form of the delegation. Therefore, delegating power to an 
administrative agency by allowing it to resolve statutory ambiguity 
should be valid whenever it would be valid for Congress to expressly 
delegate the power to choose among the potential reasonable 
interpretations of the statutory language. 
This insight was not only articulated by Monaghan in 1983; it 
was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1984 in Chevron. While Chevron 
articulated several possible explanations for Chevron deference,148 the 
theory most prominently expounded was the one just given. The Court 
explicitly analogized giving Chevron deference to agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes to respecting the exercise of 
powers expressly delegated to an agency. In the critical paragraph, the 
Court said: 
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of 
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such 
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, 
or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency 
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not 
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation 
made by the administrator of an agency.149 
That is, the Court adopted the notion that ambiguity in an agency 
statute is to be considered an “implicit” delegation of power to the 
agency, and this power should be analogized to the “express 
delegations” of power to agencies that occur all the time. 
Thus, the basic response to the critics is simple, already 
established in the scholarly literature, and already unanimously 
approved by the Supreme Court. Chevron deference is constitutionally 
permissible because it is merely a way of conceiving of what Congress 
is doing when it gives an agency ambiguous instructions. Permitting an 
agency to resolve such ambiguity is “simply one way of recognizing a 
delegation of law-making authority.”150 
So is the debate over? Not at all. 
 
 148. In addition to the main “delegation” theory discussed in the text, Chevron also hinted that 
courts should defer to agency interpretations of statutes they administer because of agencies’ 
superior expertise and because agencies are more politically accountable than courts. See Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).  
 149. Id. at 843–44 (footnote omitted). 
 150. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 26 (emphasis omitted). 
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C. Responding to the Critics’ Rejoinder 
The critics are, of course, aware of the core insight discussed in 
the previous Section. They deny that it shows Chevron deference to be 
constitutional. Fine, the critics say, let it be assumed that Congress 
intends every ambiguous statutory instruction it gives to a federal 
agency to constitute a delegation of power to the agency to resolve the 
ambiguity. That wouldn’t matter. Congress, the critics say, cannot 
displace the courts’ duty to exercise independent judgment in 
construing statutes. That duty derives from the Constitution and 
cannot be changed by statute. Hamburger, for example, says that it 
“makes no difference whether Congress authorizes agencies to 
interpret. . . . [N]o amount of statutory authority for agencies can ever 
relieve judges of their constitutional duty.”151 
Thus, to refute the critics, one needs more than simply the core 
idea previously articulated by Monaghan and embraced by the Supreme 
Court. One must also respond to the critics’ rejoinder to the core idea.152  
1. What Constitutes an “Interpretation”? 
The key response to the critics’ rejoinder is that Chevron 
deference, properly understood, does not prevent a court from 
interpreting statutes. An interpretation of a statute that determines 
that the statute delegates authority to an administrative agency is still 
an interpretation. Even if one accepts the critics’ understanding of the 
judicial duty of interpreting a statute—even assuming it to require a 
court to exercise “independent judgment”—the result of exercising that 
duty might still be the conclusion that Congress has vested the agency 
with the power to make a policy choice. 
Certainly there can be no Article III rule against a court’s 
interpreting a statute to delegate power to an agency. Courts do that all 
the time, because statutes delegate power to agencies all the time. The 
Communications Act of 1934, for example, authorizes the FCC to 
“[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and 
conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out 
the provisions of this chapter.”153 Even before Chevron the Supreme 
Court interpreted this section to authorize the Commission to make 
 
 151. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1197. 
 152. As will be noted below, Monaghan also anticipated some of the critics’ rejoinder to his 
core idea. But he could not fully respond to arguments that had not yet been made at the time he 
wrote his article, such as the argument that Congress cannot take the interpretive power from 
courts and give it to agencies. Given that powerful critics are currently attacking Chevron, it is 
vital to respond fully to their arguments. 
 153. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2012).  
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important decisions about communications policy, for example, to adopt 
the “fairness doctrine.”154 It would be absurd to say that the Court, in 
so holding, was abdicating its judicial duty to interpret the statute. The 
Court interpreted the statute—it interpreted the statute to authorize 
the agency to decide to impose the fairness doctrine. 
Of course, that statute contained an express delegation of 
authority. The question of what constitutes an “interpretation” is, 
however, independent of the degree of clarity of the statute. A court that 
holds that an ambiguous statute constitutes a delegation of power to 
the agency is interpreting the statute—it is interpreting the statute to 
authorize the agency to make a decision. The interpretation may be 
right or wrong, but it is certainly an interpretation.155 
This insight addresses the critics’ complaints about Chevron. For 
example, as noted above,156 Justice Gorsuch expresses the critics’ point 
by asking “where in [the Chevron two-step process] does a court 
interpret the law and say what it is?”157 The answer is that the court 
interprets the law when it determines that the law delegates power to 
an administrative agency. The court says what the law is when it says 
that the law is that an agency is vested with the power to make a certain 
decision. An interpretation is no less an interpretation because it 
determines that an agency has the power to make a choice.158  
The proper exercise of the judicial duty does not have to answer 
every question. As the Supreme Court once remarked, the “judicial duty 
is not less fitly performed” when the result of exercising that duty is a 
determination that the court lacks jurisdiction.159 Similarly, the judicial 
duty is not less fitly performed when the result of exercising that duty 
is a determination that Congress has vested power in an administrative 
agency. 
2. The Nature of the Power Conferred on the Agency 
This conception of Chevron deference does require a subtle but 
important shift in the conception of what kind of power Congress 
implicitly delegates to an agency when it gives an agency an ambiguous 
statutory instruction. It is often said that under Chevron an ambiguity 
 
 154. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969). 
 155. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 27 (“To be sure, the court must interpret the statute; it 
must decide what has been committed to the agency.”). 
 156. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 157. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
 158. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 27. 
 159. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). 
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in an agency-administered statute constitutes an implicit delegation of 
power to the agency to interpret the statute.160 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court may have said this in Chevron itself. In the critical passages from 
Chevron, the Court said: 
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of 
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. . . . 
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit 
rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a 
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency.161 
The Court’s use of the terms “elucidate,” “construction,” and 
“interpretation” suggest, even if they do not compel, the view that an 
ambiguous term in an agency statute is to be taken as an implicit 
delegation of authority to the agency to interpret the statute. The Court 
also, however, referred to “an agency to which Congress has delegated 
policymaking responsibilities,”162 so the opinion was not perfectly clear 
as to what kind of power an ambiguous statute implicitly delegates to 
an agency. In any event, whether Chevron said it or not, the notion that 
under Chevron ambiguous agency statutes are deemed to be delegations 
of interpretive power has become common.163 Moreover, in this 
conception of Chevron, the term “interpret” is being used in the strong 
sense explained earlier—necessarily so, as the agency always has the 
power to interpret statutes in the simple sense. 
 
 160. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“We 
most often describe Congress’ supposed choice to leave matters to agency discretion as an 
allocation of interpretive authority.”); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 314 (2013) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (“[A]gencies enjoy broad power to construe statutory provisions over which they 
have been given interpretive authority.”); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005) (“[W]hether Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to 
interpret a statute does not depend on the order in which the judicial and administrative 
constructions occur.” (emphasis added)); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 215 (2002) (“[B]oth 
[interpretations] fall within the Agency’s lawful interpretive authority.” (emphasis added)); United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“Chevron recognized that Congress not only 
engages in express delegation of specific interpretive authority, but that ‘[s]ometimes the 
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984))); Josendis v. Wall 
to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We apply Chevron deference 
when an agency properly exercises its authority, expressly or implicitly delegated by Congress, to 
interpret an ambiguous statute . . . .”); Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 495 F.3d 1355, 1360 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining what follows “if Congress expressly or implicitly delegated authority 
to an agency to interpret a statute”); Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 749 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“Chevron deference is predicated on the assumption that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an 
‘implicit delegation’ to the agency to interpret the statute.”); Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d 
200, 208 (6th Cir. 1996) (referring to “[t]he delegated authority to interpret an ambiguous term”). 
 161. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. at 865 (emphasis added). 
 163. See supra note 160. 
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In light of the critics’ Article III argument, this conception of 
Chevron, however accurate as a practical description of how Chevron 
works, must be shifted. Congress, it should be recognized, does not give 
agencies power to interpret ambiguous statutes that they administer, in 
the strong sense of “interpret.” As the critics observe, that power—the 
power to definitively determine the meaning of statutes—belongs to the 
courts. Agencies may (and indeed must) interpret statutes in the simple 
sense, but only the courts can give them definitive meaning in a judicial 
proceeding. 
As explained above, however, when a court exercises the power 
to interpret statutes, the court may determine that a statute’s best 
interpretation is that the statute confers power on the agency. The 
power thus conferred should not be regarded as interpretive power, but 
as the power to make a policy choice.164 Specifically, it is the power to 
choose to implement any of the reasonable interpretations of the 
statute. An interpretation of an ambiguous statute as vesting such 
power in the agency is an interpretation, and giving such an 
interpretation to a statute may fulfill the judicial duty to exercise 
independent judgment. 
D. Some Examples  
Some examples may help drive home the points made in the 
previous Section. This Section considers examples of cases in which a 
court determined that the best interpretation of an ambiguous legal 
text was that it conferred power on another body to make a choice, and 
yet no one would claim that the court shirked its duty to interpret the 
legal text. 
The examples are drawn from the Constitution. Of course the 
Chevron debate concerns interpretation of statutes, but constitutional 
examples provide useful illustrations of why the critics are wrong 
regarding the implications of the judicial duty to apply independent 
judgment. Constitutional examples are, in fact, especially useful, 
because they should particularly favor the judicial role in 
interpretation. The courts have long declared that giving the 
Constitution definitive meaning is a peculiarly judicial function.165 
Congress often provides directives about how courts should interpret 
 
 164. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 6 (“A statement that judicial deference is mandated to 
an administrative ‘interpretation’ of a statute is more appropriately understood as a judicial 
conclusion that some substantive law-making authority has been conferred upon the agency.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 165. E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution . . . .”). 
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statutes,166 but Congress cannot tell the courts how to interpret the 
Constitution, and the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution trumps 
any interpretation given to it by Congress.167 Therefore, if giving 
determinate meaning to ambiguous language in a legal directive were 
an inescapable part of the judicial duty to “say what the law is,” then 
one would expect to see this principle reflected most strongly in 
constitutional interpretation. Contrariwise, if in interpreting the 
Constitution courts may find that ambiguous language should be 
understood as an implicit delegation of power to other branches of 
government, it should follow a fortiori that the same is true in statutory 
interpretation. 
In fact, with regard to the legal directives contained in the 
Constitution, the courts sometimes determine that the best 
construction of ambiguous language is that it confers power on some 
other body. Two excellent examples of courts doing so come from cases 
involving the Constitution’s Apportionment Clause and the closely 
related Census Clause. These clauses provide: 
Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their 
respective Numbers . . . . The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after 
the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term 
of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.168 
These clauses seem reasonably clear at first glance—they 
instruct the government to take a decennial census of the nation’s 
population and to apportion the House of Representative based on the 
census. However, both clauses have subtleties that require elaboration, 
and the Supreme Court has faced numerous important questions 
regarding their meaning.169 In answering these questions, the Supreme 
Court did not always fully resolve the ambiguities in the clauses. In 
some cases, the Court determined that the clauses vest discretion in 
Congress to resolve ambiguities regarding what they mean. 
 
 166. See, e.g., Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. §§ 1–8 (2012); see also infra Section II.E. 
 167. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 524 (1997) (“The design of the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress 
has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the 
States. . . . The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the 
Judiciary.”).  
 168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. This Essay uses 
the term “Apportionment Clause” to refer to the first sentence quoted above and “Census Clause” 
to refer to the second sentence. The term “Census Clause” is sometimes used to cover both 
sentences. See, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 473 (2002). 
 169. In addition to the cases discussed in the text below, see, for example, Department of 
Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999), which addresses the use of 
statistical sampling techniques in conducting the census; and Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 
788 (1992), which addresses the allocation of military service members stationed overseas for 
apportionment purposes. 
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In Utah v. Evans,170 for example, the Court considered the 
Census Bureau’s practice of using “imputation” to count the number of 
inhabitants at addresses from which the Bureau’s census questionnaire 
is not returned. Under this practice, the Bureau assumes that such an 
address has the same number of inhabitants as a nearby, similar 
address.171 Utah, which lost a representative as a result of the Bureau’s 
use of imputation in the 2000 census, brought suit. It noted that the 
Census Clause requires the government to conduct an “actual 
Enumeration” of the nation’s population. It argued that this term, both 
textually and historically, means that the government must conduct the 
census as an actual count of individuals; the term, Utah asserted, 
forbids the use of estimation.172 
The suit presented a classic question of interpretation, namely, 
the meaning of the phrase “actual Enumeration” in the Constitution. If 
Chevron’s critics were right, it was the duty of the Supreme Court to 
exercise its independent judgment in fixing the meaning of that phrase. 
But while the Court exercised its independent judgment in interpreting 
the phrase “actual Enumeration,” the result was an interpretation that 
left the question at issue for resolution by Congress. The Court held: 
[T]he text uses a general word, “enumeration,” that refers to a counting process without 
describing the count’s methodological details. . . . The final part of the sentence says that 
the “actual Enumeration” shall take place “in such Manner as” Congress itself “shall by 
Law direct,” thereby suggesting the breadth of congressional methodological authority, 
rather than its limitation.173 
The Court did not shirk its duty to construe the Census Clause. 
It applied all of the usual interpretive techniques: it considered the text 
of the clause,174 its drafting history,175 and its purposes.176 The result of 
that interpretive exercise, however, was the conclusion that “the 
Framers . . . did not write detailed census methodology into the 
 
 170. 536 U.S. 452. 
 171. The Census Bureau attempts to count the nation’s inhabitants by sending a questionnaire 
to every address and following up with multiple personal visits to addresses from which the 
questionnaire is not returned. Sometimes, however, despite the Bureau’s best efforts, it is unable 
to determine how many people live at a given address. Under the imputation practice, the Bureau 
assumes that a problematic address has the same “occupancy characteristics” (including the same 
number of inhabitants) as the nearest similar neighbor that also did not return the Bureau’s 
questionnaire, but whose characteristics were successfully determined through follow-up visits. 
See id. at 458. 
 172. See Brief of Appellants at 17–18, Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (No. 01-714). 
 173. Evans, 536 U.S. at 474. 
 174. See id. at 475–76 (considering contemporary dictionary definitions of “enumeration”). 
 175. See id. at 474–75 (considering the changes made to the clause at the Constitutional 
Convention). 
 176. See id. at 477–79. 
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Constitution.”177 The Court’s role was therefore enforcing only such 
limits as the clause imposed, while respecting the choices made by 
Congress within those limits, in the exercise of the power that the 
clause conferred on Congress. As the Court concluded: “[W]e need not 
decide here the precise methodological limits foreseen by the Census 
Clause. We need say only that in this instance . . . those limits are not 
exceeded.”178 
Utah v. Evans shows that the result of a court’s independent 
interpretation of a controlling, ambiguous legal text may be the 
conclusion that the text confers discretion on some other decisionmaker. 
Even Justice Thomas, who dissented, did so only because he disagreed 
with the Court’s construction of the phrase “actual Enumeration”; he 
thought that the text and history of that phrase indicated that it 
demanded an actual, individualized count of persons and prohibited the 
use of imputation or other estimating techniques.179 He did not suggest 
that the Court was obliged to give a definitive construction to the 
phrase, or that the Court’s determination that the phrase allowed 
Congress to choose whether to use estimating techniques amounted to 
an abdication of the judicial function. 
Of course, Utah v. Evans implicated the Census Clause’s 
provision that the census would be conducted “in such Manner as 
[Congress] shall by Law direct.” This phrase expressly delegates some 
discretion to Congress. But another constitutional case shows that even 
without such express delegation, the best interpretation of an 
ambiguous, controlling legal text may be that it implicitly delegates 
discretion. 
United States Department of Commerce v. Montana180 concerned 
the Constitution’s Apportionment Clause, which provides that 
“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States . . . 
according to their respective Numbers.”181 This clause contains a clear 
command but also has a hidden ambiguity. On the one hand, it clearly 
requires state representation in the House of Representatives to be 
apportioned according to population, unlike in the Senate, where each 
state has equal representation.182 On the other hand, in implementing 
this constitutional command, one inevitably runs into an ambiguity 
caused by the problem of fractions. When parceling out representatives 
to the states according to population, there are always fractions left 
 
 177. Id. at 479. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 489 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 180. 503 U.S. 442 (1992). 
 181. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 182. Id. art. I, § 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
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over,183 yet each state’s number of representatives must be an 
integer.184 So what is to be done about the fractions? 
After trying different methods over the decades,185 Congress, 
following the 1940 census, finally settled on a method known as “the 
method of equal proportions,”186 which apportions representatives in a 
way that minimizes the relative (i.e., percentage) difference between 
the sizes of congressional districts in different states.187 Montana, 
which would have gained a representative in the 1990 apportionment if 
the apportionment had instead minimized the absolute difference 
between the sizes of congressional districts,188 brought suit and claimed 
that the method used violated the Apportionment Clause.189 
As with Utah v. Evans, the case presented a classic question of 
interpretation: What is the meaning of the constitutional command that 
representatives be apportioned to the states “according to their 
respective Numbers”?190 Does it require that an apportionment 
minimize relative population differences, absolute population 
 
 183. The total number of representatives is not specified in the Constitution but was 
statutorily fixed at 435 in 1911, see Apportionment Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 62-5, § 2, 37 Stat. 13, 
and is today maintained at that figure by 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2012), which requires a decennial 
reapportionment of “the then existing number of Representatives.” With the total number 
specified, it might seem that the Apportionment Clause could be implemented in two simple steps: 
First, determine the size of the average “ideal” congressional district by dividing the national 
population by the number of representatives. Second, determine the number of representatives to 
which each state is entitled by dividing each state’s population by the size of the ideal district. The 
problem is that when one performs the latter divisions, there are fractions left over. Today, for 
example, the ideal congressional district contains about 711,000 people. See Kristin D. Burnett, 
Congressional Apportionment: 2010 Census Briefs, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1 (2011), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLN5-ZPUV] 
(showing a national population of 309,183,463, which, divided by 435, yields an ideal congressional 
district of 710,767 people). How many districts, therefore, should be apportioned to a state with a 
population of, say, one million? If such a state received two congressional districts, it would be 
overrepresented in Congress; if only one, it would be underrepresented. 
 184. See Montana, 503 U.S. at 448 (“Because each State must be represented by a whole 
number of legislators, it was necessary either to disregard fractional remainders entirely or to 
treat some or all of them as equal to a whole Representative.”). 
 185. Congress has sometimes provided that after dividing each state’s population by the size 
of an ideal district, fractions must simply be ignored (that is, each state’s representation must be 
“rounded down” to the nearest whole number). Id. at 449. At other times Congress has provided 
for an extra representative to be given to those states for which the fraction is greater than one-
half. See id. at 450. Congress has used other methods as well. See id. at 448–51. 
 186. Congress settled on the method of equal proportions based on advice received from an 
expert committee appointed by the National Academy of Sciences. The method was codified in 
1941 and has remained in place ever since. Id. at 451–52, 452 n.25, 464 n.42, 465. 
 187. Id. at 454–55. 
 188. Id. at 445. 
 189. Id. at 446; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
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differences, or something else?191 The key point is that the Supreme 
Court did not choose any of these possible constructions for the clause. 
Instead, the Court unanimously interpreted the clause to delegate 
power to Congress to choose among alternative reasonable methods of 
solving the fractions problem inherent in apportionment.192 The Court 
said: 
What is the better measure of inequality—absolute difference in district size, absolute 
difference in share of a Representative, or relative difference in district size or share? 
Neither mathematical analysis nor constitutional interpretation provides a conclusive 
answer. . . . The polestar of equal representation does not provide sufficient guidance to 
allow us to discern a single constitutionally permissible course. . . . The constitutional 
framework that generated the need for compromise in the apportionment process must 
also delegate to Congress a measure of discretion.193 
Did the Court abdicate its judicial duty? Did it fail to say what 
the meaning of the Apportionment Clause is? Of course not. The Court 
interpreted the Apportionment Clause. The interpretation was that the 
clause—like many constitutional clauses194—delegates power to 
Congress. The power delegated by the clause is limited. Congress must 
make a choice that can reasonably be said to apportion representatives 
to the states according to their respective numbers.195 But the Court’s 
 
 191. Montana asserted that the clause required that the apportionment “achieve the greatest 
possible equality in the number of individuals per representative.” Montana, 503 U.S. at 446. 
Montana observed that if it received one more representative, and the state of Washington one 
fewer, the total deviation of all districts from the ideal size would go down, and it argued that the 
statutory apportionment was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 461. The Court, however, observed 
that while Montana’s proposed apportionment would reduce the total absolute difference between 
the size of the actual districts and the size of an ideal district, it would increase the total relative 
difference. Id. at 461–62. Under Montana’s proposed apportionment, if one took the difference 
between the population of each of Washington’s districts and the population of an ideal district, 
and did the same for each of Montana’s districts and added up all the differences, the total sum 
would be 209,165, whereas the sum of the differences in the actual, statutory apportionment was 
260,550. Id. Thus, Montana’s proposed apportionment would have reduced the overall absolute 
difference in population between actual and ideal districts. However, in Montana’s proposed 
apportionment, the size of Montana’s districts would have differed from those of ideal districts by 
42.5 percent and Washington’s by 6.7 percent, whereas in the actual apportionment those 
differences were only 40.4 percent and 5.4 percent. Id. at 462 n.40. Thus, Montana’s proposed 
apportionment would have increased the relative difference in population between actual and ideal 
districts. 
 192. Id. at 464. 
 193. Id. at 463–64 (emphasis added). 
 194. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 195. Surely, for example, Congress could not use any method of apportionment that caused 
any state to receive fewer representatives than a state with a smaller population. It also seems 
safe to say that, even if that condition were satisfied, an apportionment would not comply with the 
clause if the relationship between population and representation were not at least close to linear. 
For example, an apportionment that varied representation with the square root of population 
would satisfy the requirement that bigger states got more representatives than smaller states, but 
would surely be unconstitutional. (Under such an apportionment, a state with a population of ten 
million would receive more representatives than a state with a population of one million, but only 
about 3.2 times more, rather than ten times more.) 
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interpretation of the clause was that the clause, while setting the 
requirement of apportioning the House of Representatives by 
population, delegated to Congress the power to choose among 
reasonable methods of resolving the fractions problem that such 
apportionment inevitably entails. 
Of course, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Apportionment Clause might be right and it might be wrong. Perhaps 
the best understanding of the clause is that it fixes forever a precise 
method of dealing with the fractions problem; perhaps the best 
understanding is (as the Court held) that the clause delegates power to 
Congress to resolve the problem and even allows Congress to vary its 
resolution over time. The key point, however, is that the latter 
interpretation, whether right or wrong, is surely an interpretation. The 
Court said what the meaning of the Apportionment Clause is; the 
meaning is that the clause vests power, within limits, in Congress.196 
Whether the Court’s interpretation is right or wrong, the Court fulfilled 
its judicial duty, exercised independent judgment, and interpreted the 
Apportionment Clause, even though the result of that interpretation 
was the determination that the clause leaves certain choices up to 
Congress. 
Thus, these examples show that even in the field of 
constitutional interpretation, where the judicial role in giving meaning 
to legal language is at its zenith, sometimes the best interpretation of 
ambiguous language is that it vests decisionmaking power in a body 
other than the courts. A court may reach such a conclusion without 
violating its duty to exercise independent judgment regarding the 
meaning of the legal texts it is called upon to enforce.197  
Once this point is understood, the Article III objection to 
Chevron is defeated. The analogy between the constitutional examples 
and Chevron deference is surely clear, but to spell it out: the Census 
 
 196. Actually, the Apportionment Clause does not specify who shall make the apportionment; 
it simply states in the passive voice that representatives “shall be apportioned among the several 
States . . . according to their respective Numbers.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
The power of Congress to make the apportionment follows from the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
which authorizes Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” Id. art. I, § 8. Thus, it 
is really the two clauses together that vest Congress with implicit authority to resolve the fractions 
problem. See Montana, 503 U.S. at 464 (citing the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
 197. Of course, given that the critics are willing to challenge the unanimous decision in 
Chevron, they might not accept the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Department of 
Commerce v. Montana either. But it seems impossible that anyone could claim that the Court 
abdicated its judicial duty in that case. The Court interpreted the Constitution to delegate 
resolution of the fractions problem to Congress. One might disagree with that interpretation, but 
it seems impossible that anyone could claim that Article III forbids it. 
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Clause and the Apportionment Clause are like ambiguous agency 
statutes. They clearly delegate some power to Congress, just as an 
agency statute delegates power to an agency. But they are ambiguous 
regarding important details as to how the delegated power is to be 
exercised. The Court interpreted the instrument delegating the power 
as implicitly delegating, to the entity receiving the power, the power to 
choose among the reasonable possible resolutions of the ambiguity. 
Whether that interpretation is right or wrong, it is surely an 
interpretation. The Court may have erred, but it did not violate Article 
III. Similarly, when a court determines that an ambiguous agency 
statute is best understood as delegating to the agency the power to 
choose among the possible reasonable interpretations of the statute, the 
court is interpreting the statute. Its interpretation may be right or 
wrong, but it is still an interpretation. 
E.  The Analogy to Express Statutory Delegation 
The previous sections established that a court’s interpretation of 
an ambiguous legal text may determine that the text confers authority 
on some decisionmaker other than the court. Another route to the same 
conclusion is to recognize that once an ambiguous statute is understood 
as an instruction to an agency to choose among the possible reasonable 
interpretations of the statute, the authority it confers is no different 
from the authority that statutes confer on agencies all the time, with no 
possible Article III objection. 
Even the critics recognize that Article III poses no intrinsic 
barrier to Congress’s conferring discretion on an agency. Hamburger, 
for example, says that nothing in his article “questions the ability of 
judges to uphold an agency rule, unless they uphold it out of Chevron 
deference to the rule’s interpretation of a statute.”198 Thus, even the 
critics accept that as far as Article III is concerned, Congress could 
expressly confer on an agency the authority to make any decision that 
Chevron deference allows it to make.199 But Chevron deference is just 
another way to confer the same authority. 
Consider, for example, the decision made by the EPA in Chevron 
itself. Chevron concerned the EPA’s decision about the meaning of the 
term “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act, which imposed stringent 
permits requirements on “new or modified major stationary sources” of 
 
 198. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1200. 
 199. Some critics might still object to the delegation of such power on other grounds, 
particularly the nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
UNLAWFUL? 11, 378–79 (2014). 
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pollution.200 The EPA initially interpreted the term “stationary source” 
to apply to each piece of pollution-emitting equipment,201 so that in 
regions covered by the statute the permit requirements applied 
whenever pollution emissions increased from any single piece of 
equipment. Subsequently, however, following a change in 
administrations, the EPA implemented a scheme known as the “bubble 
concept.”202 It reinterpreted the term “stationary source” to mean an 
entire covered plant, with the result that a plant owner, without the 
need for a permit, could increase emissions from one part of its plant, 
provided there were offsetting decreases elsewhere in the same plant.203 
The Supreme Court, after articulating the rules of Chevron deference, 
upheld the agency’s new definition on the ground that it was a 
reasonable interpretation of the term “stationary source” in the Clean 
Air Act.204 
Even the critics accept that, insofar as Article III is concerned, 
Congress could have expressly authorized the EPA to make the decision 
it made. Suppose that the Clean Air Act had set forth its permit 
requirements and had then provided: 
The EPA shall by rule determine whether the permit requirements of this Act shall apply: 
 (a) to every new or modified piece of pollution-emitting equipment within a plant, or  
 (b) only to a new plant or a plant that as a whole increases its emission of pollutants. 
In such a case, even the critics would accept that Article III 
would pose no barrier to the agency’s exercising the authority conferred 
by the statute.205 Congress would simply have conferred on the agency 
discretion to make a policy choice. Congress does that all the time. The 
barrier to such delegation of discretion would, if anything, be the 
nondelegation doctrine, not Article III. 
Chevron deference, however, is nothing more than the 
generalized functional equivalent of the statute just hypothesized. It 
merely confers on agencies discretion to make the policy choice among 
the potential reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory 
language. 
This is particularly true when one recalls that, because the 
critics are claiming that Chevron is unconstitutional, defenders of 
Chevron’s constitutionality are permitted to posit that Congress has 
 
 200. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).  
 201. Id. at 857–59. 
 202. Id. at 857–58. 
 203. Id. at 857–59. 
 204. Id. at 865–66. 
 205. See Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1200. 
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passed a statute expressly instructing courts to apply Chevron.206 Let 
us do just that. It is time to provide language for the statute 
hypothesized earlier. Suppose that the “Chevron Implementation Act” 
or “CIA” provided: 
Any provision of a statute that is administered by an agency and that is susceptible of 
more than one reasonable interpretation shall be deemed to set out the provision’s 
possible, reasonable interpretations as permitted alternatives and to authorize and direct 
the agency to choose and implement one of the permitted alternatives. 
Under this hypothetical CIA, ambiguous statutory language, 
such as the actual Clean Air Act language that was at issue in Chevron, 
would be deemed to set out its possible, reasonable interpretations as 
permitted alternatives. That is, the actual Clean Air Act language at 
issue in Chevron would be deemed to be rewritten as the hypothetical 
language suggested above, giving the EPA the policy choice between 
implementing the bubble concept and applying the permit 
requirements to each piece of equipment. 
Such a regime would maintain the constitutional roles of courts 
and agencies, even as the Chevron critics conceive those roles. A court 
reviewing an agency’s implementation of an ambiguous statute would 
determine the meaning of the statute. In accordance with the CIA, that 
meaning would be an instruction to the agency to implement one of the 
statute’s possible, reasonable interpretations. The agency would 
exercise the policy discretion conferred by the statute.207 
Note that the hypothetical CIA does not authorize the agency to 
interpret an ambiguous agency statute, in the strong sense of 
“interpret.” Monaghan, in hypothesizing a Chevron-implementing 
statute, imagines that the statute “mak[es] explicit that a court must 
accept every published administrative statutory interpretation so long 
as it has a ‘reasonable basis in law.’ ”208 To answer the Chevron critics, 
however, the hypothetical CIA imagined here does not confer 
interpretive power on agencies. An agency implementing an ambiguous 
statute will, necessarily, interpret the statute in the simple sense of 
determining what it means so that the agency may follow it, and the 
agency will apply the CIA in that process. The power to interpret the 
statute in the strong sense remains with the courts, although, in 
 
 206. See supra Section II.A.2. 
 207. This point also addresses Farina’s claim that regarding ambiguities in agency statutes as 
implicit delegations of power logically implies that there is no distinction between the legislative 
and judicial roles. Farina, supra note 38, at 477. The roles remain distinct. Under the CIA, courts, 
exercising “the mind-set of the Interpreter,” id. at 478, would determine the potential range of 
reasonable meanings that an agency statute could bear; that statute would then be understood to 
instruct the agency to implement one of the reasonable alternatives.  
 208. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 5 (emphasis added). 
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accordance with the CIA, the court will interpret the statute to confer 
policy discretion on the implementing agency. 
The ability of Congress to pass a statute like the hypothetical 
CIA shows that Chevron does not violate Article III. Discretion 
conferred on an agency via statutory ambiguity is equivalent to 
discretion expressly conferred to choose among statutory alternatives. 
Before leaving this Section, however, it is necessary to address several 
potential objections to the arguments just made. 
1. Is Chevron Deference Really the Same as Discretion Expressly 
Conferred? 
Professor Hamburger would object to the previous argument. He 
would object to the suggestion that Chevron deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute is equivalent to an agency’s 
exercise of policy discretion expressly conferred by statute, and that 
Chevron deference therefore does not entail an agency’s exercising the 
judicial power to interpret law. He would say: 
Such an argument is correct in assuming that agencies use their interpretation of statutes 
as a means of making law, but it goes too far when it assumes that administrative 
interpretation therefore is not an attempt to say what the law is. Undoubtedly, 
interpretation can function as a mode of making law, but this does not mean it is not also 
interpretation.209 
This objection, however, would fail under the regime of the CIA. 
Hamburger’s argument is that agencies cannot exercise their power to 
make social policy decisions in a way that usurps the judicial power of 
interpretation. However, the judiciary has an exclusive claim to 
interpretive power only in the strong sense. If the CIA were in place, an 
agency giving content to an ambiguous statute would be doing no more 
than interpreting the statute in the simple sense. But everyone agrees 
that agencies can do that. 
An agency implementing an ambiguous statute under the 
regime of the CIA would of course have to interpret the statute in the 
simple sense of determining what the statute means. As noted earlier, 
everyone, including Hamburger, recognizes that agencies may (and 
indeed must) interpret statutes in this sense.210 But with the CIA in 
place, an agency conducting its interpretation of an ambiguous statute 
would have to apply the rule of the CIA; that is, the agency would have 
to determine that the statute should be deemed to set forth its possible 
reasonable interpretations as permitted alternatives and to instruct the 
agency to choose one of the alternatives. Doing so would be part of 
 
 209. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1220. 
 210. See id. at 1196. 
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simply determining what the statute means so that the agency can 
implement it. 
The agency’s interpretation would not be interpretation in the 
strong sense. It would still be up to a reviewing court to give a definitive 
construction to the statute. Of course, in accordance with the CIA, the 
court, if it agreed that the statute was ambiguous, would also need to 
deem the statute to set forth its possible reasonable interpretations as 
permitted alternatives and to instruct the agency to choose one of the 
alternatives. The court’s determination of what the permitted 
alternatives are would be definitive. Thus, the power to interpret the 
statute in the strong sense would remain with the court. 
 The critics would doubtless complain that this regime would 
simply be the functional equivalent of Chevron deference. But that’s the 
whole point. The point of imagining the CIA is to show that by giving 
appropriate interpretive instructions, Congress could transmute the 
process by which agencies construe ambiguities in statutes from 
forbidden strong-sense interpretation to permitted (and indeed 
necessary) simple-sense interpretation. 
Under the hypothetical CIA, a court would still definitively 
interpret an ambiguous agency statute. The court would definitively 
determine that the statute conferred authority on the agency to exercise 
discretion to make a policy choice. The court would also definitively 
determine the limits of the agency’s discretion. As shown earlier, an 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute that determines that the statute 
confers discretion on an agency is still an interpretation. With the 
hypothetical CIA in place, it would be the correct interpretation. 
2. Could Congress Really Give Such an Interpretive Instruction? 
A critic might also question whether Congress could really give 
courts (and agencies) the general interpretive instruction that the CIA 
would give. Can Congress tell courts how to interpret statutes? The 
answer is yes. 
As I have previously explained,211 the power to give instructions 
inherently includes the power to say how those instructions should be 
understood. Just as a boss may instruct an employee that, “whenever I 
say ‘mail this,’ I really mean ‘make a copy of this, put the copy in my 
box, and mail the original by ordinary, first-class mail,’ ” so too any giver 
of instructions may give rules for interpreting those instructions. 
Congress cannot give the courts instructions as to how to interpret the 
 
 211. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1500–05 (2000). 
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Constitution,212 because Congress is not the source of the instructions 
in the Constitution. But the People, who are the source of the 
Constitution, can and did include in it instructions as to how the 
Constitution should be construed.213 Similarly, Congress, the giver of 
statutory instructions, may provide by statute for how those 
instructions are to be interpreted.214 
Congress does this frequently and uncontroversially. Congress 
passes statutes that include interpretive instructions such as defining 
terms for the statute involved (this is extremely common),215 or 
providing more generalized interpretive directions such as a rule that a 
statute is to be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes.216 Statutes 
such as the Dictionary Act even provide definitions or interpretive 
principles that apply to other statutes generally.217 
One might still question, however, whether Congress could give 
the interpretive instruction in the proposed, hypothetical CIA. It is one 
thing, one might say, for Congress to include a “definitions” section in a 
statute or even for it to give general definitions applicable to all 
 
 212. See supra notes 165–167 and accompanying text (citing Supreme Court cases affirming 
the judiciary’s role as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution). 
 213. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“[N]othing in this Constitution shall be so construed as 
to Prejudice any [territorial] Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”); id. amend. 
IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”); id. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); 
id. amend. XVII (“This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of 
any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.”). 
 214. See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 2106–07. Rosenkranz agrees that Congress has a 
“vast” power to “codify some tools of statutory interpretation,” id. at 2088, and that this power 
includes the power to provide not only definitions applicable to a particular statute, id. at 2105, 
but also definitions applicable to all statutes, id. at 2117–20, and more general interpretive 
instructions, such as statutes that codify or abrogate judicially developed interpretive canons. Id. 
at 2109; see also 1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 27:1, at 604 (7th ed. 2009) (explaining that a legislature may provide statutory 
definitions or “directives specifying how provisions in the same statute or other statutes are to be 
construed and applied”). 
 Rosenkranz correctly points out that there are some limits to Congress’s power over 
interpretation. Congress could not, for example, require courts to defer to the constructions placed 
on a statute by a specified congressional committee after the statute is passed, as such a 
requirement would constitute a delegation of power to Congress itself in violation of the anti-
aggrandizement principle of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714 (1986). Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 2134. But Chevron does not violate the rule against self-
delegation, as it vests power in the executive, not in Congress itself. 
 As noted earlier, see supra note 19, Rosenkranz suggests that Chevron is unconstitutional, but 
the arguments made in Sections II.B and II.C address his point insofar as it is based on a judicial 
duty to interpret statutes de novo. 
 215. See almost any federal statute, really, but for a particular example, see 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012), which provides numerous definitions of terms used in the Copyright Act. 
 216. Siegel, supra note 211, at 1502. 
 217. Id. at 1502–03. 
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statutes, as in the Dictionary Act. Does it really follow that Congress 
can give generalized, mind-bending interpretive instructions such as 
those posited in the CIA, under which a statute that says one thing is 
to be deemed to say something entirely different? 
The answer is, or at least should be, yes. Existing statutes 
provide that other statutes shall be deemed rewritten in specified ways, 
and courts apply these interpretive instructions. Such deeming is, for 
example, common when powers of one agency are transferred to 
another. For example, following the transfer of functions from 
numerous agencies to the new Department of Homeland Security, 
Congress provided: 
With respect to any function transferred[,] . . . reference in any other Federal law to any 
department, commission, or agency or any officer or office the functions of which are so 
transferred shall be deemed to refer to the Secretary, other official, or component of the 
Department to which such function is so transferred.218 
Courts have enforced this provision,219 and there are numerous 
other statutes stating that statutory language that says one thing shall 
be deemed to say something else.220 A provision of the Dictionary Act 
even says that “[t]he word ‘company’ or ‘association’, when used in 
reference to a corporation, shall be deemed to embrace the words 
‘successors and assigns of such company or association’, in like manner 
as if these last-named words, or words of similar import, were 
expressed.”221 It is thus commonplace for Congress to instruct courts to 
deem statutory language to be rewritten in specified ways. 
Moreover, courts conduct such mind-bending statutory 
rewriting even without congressional instruction, particularly when 
doing so saves a statute’s constitutionality. Doing so with congressional 
instruction should therefore certainly be possible. 
Consider two examples, one well known, the other less so. The 
well-known example is National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius (“NFIB”),222 the case in which the Supreme Court upheld the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (also known as 
 
 218. 6 U.S.C. § 557 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 219. E.g., Scheerer v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 513 F.3d 1244, 1251 n.6 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 220. E.g., 22 U.S.C. § 4191 (2012) (providing that statutes in Title 18 of the Revised Statutes 
that expressly apply only to particular classes of consular officers shall be deemed to apply as well 
to all other classes of such officers, plus other State Department employees designated by the 
Secretary of State); 22 U.S.C. § 6571 (providing, similarly to 6 U.S.C. § 557, that statutory 
references to agencies whose functions had been transferred shall be deemed references to other 
agencies); 26 U.S.C. § 6665(a)(2) (2012) (providing that references to “tax” in the tax code shall be 
deemed to refer also to tax penalties and additions to tax), enforced, Carroll v. United States, 339 
F.3d 61, 76 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 221. 1 U.S.C. § 5 (2012) (emphasis added), enforced, Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 
F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 222. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
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“Obamacare”) against constitutional challenge. In doing so, the Court 
upheld the statute’s “individual mandate” that all Americans purchase 
health insurance. The key opinion, by Chief Justice Roberts, achieved 
this result by reconceiving the nature of the mandate.223 Chief Justice 
Roberts first determined that Congress lacked power under the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause to impose the 
individual mandate directly.224 But he then saved the mandate by 
recharacterizing it, not as a direct command to buy health insurance, 
but as a tax on not buying health insurance. He did so even though 
“[t]he most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands 
individuals to purchase insurance,”225 even though the Court held that 
the mandate is not a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act,226 and 
even though the statute describes the payment required of those who 
fail to fulfill the mandate as a “penalty,” not as a “tax.”227 In other 
words, the Chief Justice saved the mandate by rewriting the statute 
that imposed it to say something quite different from, although 
functionally equivalent to, what it actually said. In doing so, the Chief 
Justice was expressly motivated by the need to save the statute’s 
constitutionality.228 NFIB thus shows that a court may deem statutory 
language rewritten in a different way.  
One might, perhaps, try to dismiss NFIB as sui generis; the 
reasoning of such a momentous and politically charged case should not, 
one might say, be assumed to apply routinely. But the routine, little-
known case of Durousseau v. United States229 shows that the principle 
that statutes can be notionally rewritten in different language is a 
general one. 
Durousseau involved a question of the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is given by Article III of the 
Constitution, subject to “such Exceptions . . . as the Congress shall 
make.”230 That is, Congress does not have power to give appellate 
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court; it has the power to make exceptions 
to the appellate jurisdiction given to the Court by the Constitution. And 
yet, as the Court observed, Congress has not purported to make 
 
 223. Id. at 561–70. 
 224. Id. at 546–61. 
 225. Id. at 562. 
 226. Id. at 546.  
 227. Id. at 564. 
 228. See id. at 562 (“[I]f a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the 
Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so.”). 
 229. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810). Durousseau, decided over two hundred years ago, has been 
cited about one hundred times in Westlaw’s JLR database. NFIB was decided less than a decade 
ago, yet has already been cited more than 1,800 times.  
 230. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, but has 
passed statutes describing that jurisdiction affirmatively.231 Does this 
mean that the statutes are ineffective? Not at all. Speaking through 
Chief Justice Marshall, the Court said that the statutes’ affirmative 
description of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction “has been understood to 
imply a negative on the exercise of such appellate power as is not 
comprehended within it.”232 That is, although the statutes were phrased 
as affirmatively giving jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, the Court was 
willing to deem them to be written differently. If the statutes 
collectively say that “the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction over cases meeting criteria X, Y, or Z,” the Court deems the 
statutes to say that “the Supreme Court shall not have appellate 
jurisdiction over cases not meeting criteria X, Y, or Z.” 
Again, in agreeing to perceive the statutes as being written quite 
differently from their actual language, the Court was motivated by 
constitutional considerations. The Court said that “[w]hen the first 
legislature of the union proceeded to carry the third article of the 
constitution into effect, they must be understood as intending to execute 
the power they possessed of making exceptions to the appellate 
jurisdiction of the supreme court.”233 Thus, where a statute’s actual 
language appears to be an exercise of power Congress does not 
constitutionally possess (e.g., conferring appellate jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court), a court may deem the statute to be rewritten in 
different language that would achieve the same result but by exercising 
a power Congress does possess (e.g., making exceptions to the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court). 
The interpretive attitude on display in NFIB and Durousseau 
helps rescue Chevron from the critics. Those cases show that courts 
have a duty, where possible, to construe statutes in a way that saves 
their constitutionality, even deeming the statutes to be rewritten in 
different language where necessary. Therefore, even if one concedes the 
critics’ claim that Article III prohibits Congress from conferring 
interpretive power on agencies, courts would have a duty to deem 
statutes that appear to do so rewritten in a way that saves their 
constitutionality. In accomplishing this, the hypothetical CIA would 
only reinforce what would already be a judicial duty. 
 
 231. 10 U.S. at 314. 
 232. Id.  
 233. Id. 
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3. Is That How Chevron Really Works? 
The critics might further object that the CIA is too clever by half. 
The statute, they might say, is not an accurate picture of how Chevron 
really works. The attempt to envision Chevron as a delegation of power 
to make policy choices ignores, the critics might argue, the reality that 
Chevron effectively delegates interpretive power to agencies. The critics 
might also point out that even under the hypothetical CIA, courts would 
in all likelihood not interpret an ambiguous agency statute by spelling 
out all the reasonable possible interpretations and determining 
whether the agency had properly exercised its power to choose among 
them; courts would simply determine whether the one interpretation 
arrived at by the agency was reasonable. Again, the critics would argue, 
this suggests that the agency is really exercising interpretive power. 
The CIA, they might argue, shouldn’t fool anyone. 
The critics would have a point. Even if the legal world 
reconceived Chevron as deeming ambiguous agency statutes to 
constitute delegations of policymaking power rather than interpretive 
power—indeed, even if the hypothetical CIA were in place—the regime 
of Chevron would as a practical matter be equivalent to one in which 
Congress delegated interpretive power to agencies. Moreover, the 
conception that ambiguous statutes delegate interpretive power might 
seem a more natural fit for Chevron’s practical impact than the 
conception that they delegate policymaking power. 
But this is not fatal to Chevron’s constitutionality. Again, NFIB 
and Durousseau are instructive. They show that when a statute’s 
practical effect may be conceived in different ways, one constitutional 
and the other unconstitutional, the courts should favor the 
constitutional conception, even when it is the less natural one. The 
practical effect of statutes conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court 
in specified cases and statutes excepting jurisdiction in all other cases 
is the same, but the Court in Durousseau adopted the latter, 
constitutional conception of the statutes at issue even though the 
statutes’ wording was far more consistent with the former. In NFIB the 
Court characterized the individual mandate as a constitutional tax even 
though in both language and practical effect it was a penalty. Indeed, 
in NFIB the Court performed even further gymnastics when it 
conceived the individual mandate as a tax for constitutional purposes 
even as it determined that the mandate was not a tax for purposes of 
the Anti-Injunction Act.234 So the fact that Chevron can be conceived, 
 
 234. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 546 (2012). 
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and indeed might more naturally be conceived, as deeming ambiguous 
statutes to delegate interpretive power is not fatal. 
Nor is it a problem that in practice, even if the CIA were in effect, 
courts would not likely interpret ambiguous agency statutes by spelling 
out every possible reasonable interpretation and treating the result as 
a menu from which the agency might choose, but would determine only 
whether the particular choice made by the agency is permitted. Courts 
often decide no more than is necessary to determine the result of a 
case.235 In the Utah case discussed above, for example, having 
determined that the Census Clause delegated to Congress the power to 
choose among reasonable census methodologies, the Supreme Court did 
not determine the full set of potential reasonable methods; it 
determined only that the method chosen by Congress was among 
them.236 Indeed, when construing the Constitution, the Court 
frequently leaves matters to future development,237 but that does not 
mean that the construction that the Court does give to the Constitution 
is not an interpretation. Similarly, if a court can dispose of a case by 
interpreting a statute sufficiently to decide the issues before it, the 
court need not determine every detail of the statute’s meaning for its 
reading to be an interpretation. 
* * * 
In sum, the Article III objection to Chevron deference fails. 
Properly understood, Chevron does not wrest the interpretive power 
from courts and give it to agencies. It leaves courts to interpret agency 
statutes, but under an implicit rule (which could be made explicit by 
Congress’s passage of the hypothetical CIA) that ambiguous statutes 
are to be deemed to delegate policy discretion to agencies. An 
interpretation of a statute that determines that the statute delegates 
discretion is still an interpretation. 
F. Addressing Other Critiques 
The main point of this Essay, now hopefully accomplished, is to 
address the critics’ Article III objections to Chevron. Addressing other 
 
 235. See, e.g., United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 174 (1984) (“Following our 
usual practice of deciding no more than is necessary to dispose of the case before us, we express no 
opinion on [an issue not before the Court].”). 
 236. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 479 (2002). 
 237. E.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (determining that the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms is subject to some regulation, but not “undertak[ing] an 
exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope of the Second Amendment”). 
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objections to Chevron is not the main point. Still, this Section addresses 
some other significant points made by the critics. 
1. Hamburger’s “Bias” Objection 
As noted above, Hamburger, in addition to arguing that Chevron 
unconstitutionally strips the interpretive power from courts and gives 
it to agencies, also argues that Chevron violates the Due Process Clause 
by requiring courts to show deference to one of the parties to a case (in 
Chevron cases in which the government is a party).238 The previous 
sections of the Essay also refute the bias argument by showing that 
Chevron deference can be assimilated to judicial review of agency action 
taken pursuant to express delegation of authority. 
There is no bias when a judge enforces a statute that expressly 
delegates authority to an administrative agency. Innumerable statutes 
expressly delegate authority to an agency to make some decision—say, 
to set the maximum levels of a pollutant in the air239 or drinking 
water240 in accordance with a statutory standard. In such cases, when 
the agency exercises the power delegated to it, judicial review is 
routinely held to be available only for rationality.241 Challengers of the 
agency’s action therefore labor under the same burden as to which 
Hamburger complains—they can win only if they convince a reviewing 
court that the agency’s action is not only wrong, but irrational. The 
agency has a clear advantage. And yet no one would claim that courts 
are unconstitutionally showing bias in favor of agencies in such cases. 
The agencies have the advantage simply because courts will necessarily 
permit the agencies to exercise the power conferred on them by statute. 
Indeed, as noted earlier, even Hamburger’s article does not 
question the ability of courts to uphold agency regulations passed 
pursuant to an express delegation of authority.242 If, for example, the 
 
 238. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1211–13. 
 239. See, e.g., Nat’l Envtl. Dev. Ass’n’s Clean Air Project v. EPA, 686 F.3d 803, 812–13 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (concerning such an action under the Clean Air Act). 
 240. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1211, 1218–19 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(concerning such an action under the Drinking Water Act). 
 241. See, e.g., Nat’l Envtl. Dev., 686 F.3d at 810 (“Although we must perform a ‘searching and 
careful’ inquiry into the facts, we do not look at the decision as would a scientist, but ‘as a reviewing 
court exercising our narrowly defined duty of holding agencies to certain minimal standards of 
rationality.’ ” (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc))); Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 824 F.2d at 1216 (“Happily, it is not for the judicial branch to undertake 
comparative evaluations of conflicting scientific evidence. Our review aims only to discern whether 
the agency’s evaluation was rational.”). 
 242. Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1200. Note that this paragraph is limited to objections 
posed in the Hamburger article under discussion. Hamburger’s other works question the power of 
agency rulemaking more generally. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 199, at 11, 378. 
Siegel_Galley (Do Not Delete) 4/13/2018  9:16 AM 
984 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:3:937 
statute at issue in Chevron itself had expressly delegated to the EPA 
the power to choose between applying the Clean Air Act’s permit 
requirements to each piece of equipment within a plant or only to entire 
plants, as hypothesized earlier,243 Hamburger’s article would not 
question letting the agency make that choice, and no one would assert 
that a court was showing “bias” in approving the agency’s exercise of 
the express power to choose from among statutory alternatives. Of 
course an agency is empowered to make a selection from among choices 
expressly stated in a statute. The court would simply have determined 
that the agency was properly exercising statutory power expressly 
delegated to it. 
But under the hypothetical CIA, an ambiguous agency statute is 
deemed to be rewritten as an express delegation of power to make a 
policy choice among the statute’s reasonable possible interpretations. 
Therefore, there would be no “bias” when a court first interprets an 
ambiguous agency statute in the way Congress has instructed, and then 
enforces the agency’s action within the power delegated to the agency. 
Courts would not be showing bias toward agencies in approving such 
choices; they would simply be approving agency power deemed to have 
been expressly delegated. 
In other words, the bias argument does not add anything to the 
attack on Chevron’s constitutionality. If Article III allows courts to 
deem an ambiguity in an agency statute to be a delegation of power to 
the agency to make a policy choice among the potentially reasonable 
interpretations of the ambiguous statutory provision, then the Due 
Process Clause does not prohibit courts from allowing the agency to 
exercise the power thus conferred. 
2. Questioning Whether Congress Intended Chevron Deference 
The main focus of this Essay has been on the critics’ 
constitutional critique of Chevron. Some of the critics, however, also 
question whether Chevron is correct as a matter of statutory 
construction. Justice Gorsuch argues that there is little evidence that 
Congress actually intends statutory ambiguities to constitute 
delegations of authority to agencies.244 Professor Farina devotes a 
section of her article to the same point.245 
On this issue, the critics have a good point. Congress has never 
passed the hypothetical CIA. Congress’s actual direction to courts with 
 
 243. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 244. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
 245. Farina, supra note 38, at 468–76. 
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regard to legal issues that arise in judicial review of administrative 
action, insofar as one exists, is § 706 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act. That statute provides that “[t]o the extent necessary to decision 
and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant 
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action.”246 While this language is not, perhaps, completely inconsistent 
with deferential review, it is surely suggestive of a de novo standard.247 
Indeed, Kenneth Culp Davis made this point almost apoplectically in 
his famous Administrative Law Treatise decades ago.248 
It is not the purpose of this Essay to defend Chevron against the 
charge that it misconstrues Congress’s actual direction to courts 
regarding statutory interpretation. Perhaps the best that can be said is 
that Congress’s silence in the face of the long-standing judicial decisions 
giving deference to agency statutory construction—particularly since 
Chevron but going back even before that249—suggests that Congress is 
not averse to Chevron deference. Of course, reasoning from 
congressional silence is always dangerous, and never more so than in 
an area in which such silence is imagined to give rise to an inference 
that Congress has delegated power to the executive. In such an area the 
president would likely veto any congressional attempt to reclaim the 
power, and so it would be particularly difficult for Congress to defeat 
the inference by express action. So the suggestion that courts may infer 
congressional approval of Chevron from Congress’s failure to overturn 
it is offered tepidly, only so that this critical argument might receive 
some response. The real response is that Congress could eliminate any 
doubt about its intent by passing the hypothetical CIA. 
3. Does Chevron Make Obedience to Law Harder? 
Justice Gorsuch adds the suggestion that Chevron makes it more 
difficult for ordinary citizens to obey the law. He complains: 
 
 246. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 247. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(arguing that § 706 “contemplates that courts, not agencies, will authoritatively resolve 
ambiguities in statutes and regulations”).  
 248. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EIGHTIES: 1989 SUPPLEMENT TO 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 507–26 (1989). Davis was particularly upset that the Court was 
not following what he regarded as the clear command of § 706 that a reviewing court “shall decide 
all relevant questions of law.” He quoted that language more than twenty separate times (five 
times as a block quote), id. at 509–13, 515–16, 518–19, 525, and said that “[t]he contrast between 
the statutory words and the Court’s words could hardly be stronger.” Id. at 510. 
 249. See, e.g., supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
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Under Chevron the people aren’t just charged with awareness of and the duty to conform 
their conduct to the fairest reading of the law that a detached magistrate can muster. 
Instead, they are charged with an awareness of Chevron; required to guess whether the 
statute will be declared “ambiguous” (courts often disagree on what qualifies); and 
required to guess (again) whether an agency’s interpretation will be deemed “reasonable.” 
Who can even attempt all that, at least without an army of perfumed lawyers and 
lobbyists?250  
Putting aside Justice Gorsuch’s reference to “perfumed” 
lawyers,251 this attack on Chevron seems misguided. It is certainly true 
that it can be difficult for ordinary citizens to discern the meaning of 
complex statutory law that they are nonetheless assumed to 
understand.252 But Justice Gorsuch provides no evidence that Chevron 
makes things worse on this point. After all, even in areas where Chevron 
does not apply (or before Chevron was decided), the public faces (or 
faced) the same difficulty of discerning the meaning of statutory texts. 
It took years of litigation and conflicting lower court opinions before the 
Supreme Court finally decided, for example, that the Americans with 
Disabilities Act requires professional golf tournaments to make 
accommodations for disabled golfers,253 that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
did not apply retroactively,254 and that plaintiffs in a class action cannot 
aggregate claims to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for 
diversity jurisdiction.255 Justice Gorsuch implicitly suggests that the 
public may predict “the fairest reading of the law that a detached 
magistrate can muster” easily, or at least more easily than the public 
can predict the outcome of statutory interpretation under Chevron’s 
deference regime, but he offers no evidence that this is true. Yes, courts 
may disagree as to whether a statute is ambiguous and whether an 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable, but courts might disagree about 
the meanings of statutes even if there were no such thing as Chevron 
deference. 
 
 250. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
 251. Presumably, Justice Gorsuch is not seriously suggesting that lawyers who wear perfume 
serve an especially elite clientele. Perfume is seemingly used here as a metaphor for high costs. 
Justice Gorsuch appears to be appealing to populist resentment against members of the elite who 
can afford to hire high-priced lawyers to help them decipher and exploit obscure legal 
requirements.  
 252. E.g., Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985) (“All citizens are presumptively charged 
with knowledge of the law.”). 
 253. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674 (2001) (noting conflicting decisions in the 
courts of appeals on this point). 
 254. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994) (determining that Congress 
had no intent for the statute to apply retroactively). For conflicting lower court decisions, see, for 
example, Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1993), which holds the act to be 
retroactive and notes that the holding “break[s] ranks with the other circuits that have decided 
this issue”. 
 255. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 334 (1969) (noting conflict in circuits). 
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4. Does Chevron Violate the Nondelegation Doctrine?  
As noted earlier, some of the critics acknowledge that the alleged 
Article III problem with Chevron might be ameliorated by regarding the 
power implicitly delegated to agencies by an ambiguous statute as being 
not the power to interpret the statute, but rather the power to make a 
policy choice.256 They suggest, however, that so conceived, Chevron may 
violate the nondelegation doctrine.257 Congress, these critics suggest, 
may no more give agencies the legislative power than it may give them 
the judicial power. Chevron, they contend, makes a mockery of the 
nondelegation doctrine’s requirement that statutes granting discretion 
to agencies must lay down an “intelligible principle” to guide that 
discretion.258 
There can be little doubt that the nondelegation doctrine has 
failed to live up to that promise. Courts apply the “intelligible principle” 
test in theory but in practice approve delegations of power restricted by 
principles that can only be called unintelligible. Courts approve 
delegations limited by standards such as that rates be “just and 
reasonable,”259 or that an agency’s actions serve “the public interest, 
convenience, and necessity,”260 even though these empty standards are 
open to “any conceivable interpretation.”261 Courts applying the 
“intelligible principle” test regularly find “intelligible principles where 
less discerning readers find gibberish.”262 The result is that “supposed 
limitations on delegations of legislative power are little more than a 
legal joke.”263 
So the critics are correct that the nondelegation doctrine does 
little to enforce its supposed restraints on the delegation of legislative 
power to executive agencies. Again, however, what is missing from the 
critics’ arguments is any real showing that Chevron makes things worse 
 
 256. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (noting ambiguity); Hamburger, supra note 19, at 1206–10 (discussing the 
decisionmaking power of judges); supra text accompanying note 81 (noting Justice Gorsuch’s 
concurrence). 
 257. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the 
“potentially unconstitutional delegations we have come to countenance in the name of Chevron 
deference”); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153–54 (“The fact is, Chevron’s claim about 
legislative intentions is no more than a fiction . . . .”). 
 258. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153–54. 
 259. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600–01 (1944). 
 260. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943). 
 261. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative 
Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 474 (1985). 
 262. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 329 (2002). 
 263. Jonathan R. Siegel, The REINS Act and the Struggle to Control Agency Rulemaking, 16 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 161 (2013). 
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in this regard. Recall that, as noted earlier, Congress might have 
expressly delegated to an agency any choice that it is deemed under 
Chevron to have delegated implicitly via ambiguity.264 Such an express 
delegation of power to make a policy choice might or might not violate 
the nondelegation doctrine (almost certainly not, these days), but if it 
does not, a functionally equivalent implicit delegation of power to make 
the same choice should be equally valid. The nondelegation doctrine is 
about whether the executive is capable of receiving a given 
choicemaking power at all, not about whether Congress confers the 
power implicitly or explicitly. 
True, the nondelegation doctrine theoretically demands that 
Congress lay down an “intelligible principle” to guide power delegated 
to an executive agency. But as just noted, courts are willing to let almost 
any standard satisfy this test. A general standard could easily be 
provided by the hypothetical Chevron Implementation Act. Recall that 
the CIA language given earlier provided that an ambiguous provision 
in an agency statute shall be deemed to set out its reasonable 
interpretations as alternatives and to authorize and direct the 
implementing agency to choose one of the alternatives.265 A second 
sentence could easily add that “In making this choice, the agency shall 
be guided by the purposes of the statute containing the ambiguous 
provision.” That would suffice for nondelegation doctrine purposes.266 
Justice Gorsuch argues that Chevron makes things worse (from 
the perspective of the nondelegation doctrine) by permitting agencies to 
change their interpretations of ambiguous statutes over time.267 
Permitting such vacillation, he argues, erodes the limitations that the 
nondelegation doctrine requires on the exercise of delegated power.268 
Again, however, Chevron makes things no worse on this point. Agencies 
are equally allowed to change the rules they make when acting 
pursuant to express delegations of power.269 Any vacillation permitted 
 
 264. See supra Section II.E (discussing how Article III does not bar Congress from expressly 
delegating the authority to an agency to make any decision that would otherwise be made under 
Chevron).  
 265. See supra notes 206–208 and accompanying text. 
 266. Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 426–27 (1944) (approving the delegation 
of power to fix certain prices in a way that “the prices fixed shall be fair and equitable, that in 
addition they shall tend to promote the purposes of the Act”). 
 267. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (noting that agencies that are able to change rules from one day to the next offer little 
“substantial guidance” or “clearly delineated boundaries”). 
 268. See id. (stating that Chevron serves to place the power of determining the meaning of the 
law in the hands of those who are charged with enforcing the law). 
 269. In Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), for example, the Supreme 
Court upheld the EPA’s revision of its National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) against 
a nondelegation challenge. In holding that the scope of discretion conferred by the relevant statute 
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by Chevron could equally be permitted by an express delegation of 
power to make a policy choice accompanied by express authorization to 
vary that choice over time in response to changing social and political 
conditions (such authorization could also be added to the hypothetical 
CIA to apply generally). Again, there might or might not be a 
nondelegation problem, but if there is one, it derives from the scope of 
the power conferred, not from the fact that the power is conferred 
implicitly via statutory ambiguity.  
Perhaps what Justices Thomas and Gorsuch mean is that the 
principle of Chevron deference violates nondelegation as it should be—
a robust, reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine of the kind that Justice 
Thomas has hinted he might be willing to adopt.270 That may well be 
true. If the nondelegation doctrine were more robust, it might forbid 
empowering agencies to make the choices that Chevron posits Congress 
has delegated to them. But such a vigorous nondelegation doctrine 
would equally undermine Congress’s ability to delegate those same 
choices to agencies expressly. Again, the issue is the vast degree of 
delegation that the Court has approved, not the way that Chevron 
allows the delegation to be implicit rather than express.  
Alone among the critics, Professor Farina provides some reasons 
why Chevron makes things worse in terms of the nondelegation 
doctrine. She suggests that when the Supreme Court loosened the 
nondelegation doctrine by inventing the “intelligible principle” test271 
and the requirement that statutory standards be sufficiently clear that 
a reviewing court could tell whether they were being obeyed,272 the 
Court reached a “constitutional accommodation” whereby extra power 
could be delegated to agencies provided there was judicial policing of 
the limits on that power.273 The result was not, Farina suggests, simply 
 
was “well within the outer limits of our nondelegation precedents,” id. at 474, the Court looked at 
the content of the applicable statutory standard. It noted that the statute required the EPA to set 
the NAAQS at a level “requisite . . . to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety.” 
Id. at 475–76 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court barely mentioned the fact that the 
statute allowed, and indeed required, the agency to change the NAAQS over time; it mentioned 
that the NAAQS “reflect the latest scientific knowledge.” Id. at 473. But this seemed of little 
relevance to the nondelegation holding. 
 270. See supra note 78. 
 271. Farina, supra note 38, at 483–84. 
 272. Id. at 485–86. 
 273. Id. at 487. Of course, some authorities would deny that the nondelegation doctrine 
permits some delegation of lawmaking authority, provided the authority be sufficiently 
circumscribed, preferring instead to say that the doctrine permits the delegation of some 
decisionmaking authority (provided the authority be guided by an intelligible principle), but not 
any lawmaking power whatsoever. Compare Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (holding that the 
Constitution permits no delegation of the legislative power), with id. at 488 (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (asserting that the rulemaking power delegated to the agency should be forthrightly 
characterized as legislative). 
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that the Court approved extra delegation of power; rather, that 
approval occurred as part of a bargain that included a certain level of 
judicial review. Chevron, Farina suggests, undoes the terms of that 
bargain by permitting agencies to interpret the limits of their own 
powers274 and also contributes to a dangerous accumulation of power in 
the executive branch.275 
One might respond with the same response given above to the 
other critics: whatever decisionmaking authority Congress implicitly 
confers on agencies by virtue of Chevron, Congress could have conveyed 
to agencies expressly.276 The authority conferred might or might not 
violate the nondelegation doctrine, but the form by which the authority 
was conferred should make no difference. Once again, therefore, 
Chevron makes things no worse from a nondelegation perspective. 
Farina, however, might suggest that this analysis assumes that 
whenever Congress vests an agency with authority via an ambiguous 
statute (thereby triggering Chevron deference), Congress would be 
willing to vest the agency with the same authority via an express 
delegation. But this is not necessarily true. Yes, one possible reason for 
statutory ambiguity is that Congress desired to vest the agency with 
authority and chose to do so by using broad or ambiguous statutory 
language.277 However, it is also possible that competing factions within 
Congress each desired to give the agency clearer instructions but 
neither side had the votes to clarify the statutory text in its preferred 
way,278 or that members of Congress thought the statutory language 
was clear and did not know that they were delegating authority to the 
agency.279 The principle of Chevron deference applies without regard to 
which of these reasons might be the true reason for statutory 
ambiguity.280 
Thus, Farina could argue, Chevron deference does make things 
worse from a nondelegation perspective, because it does more than 
simply approve intentional, but implicit, delegations of power that could 
have been made explicit. It also enhances agency powers in situations 
in which Congress did not imagine that it was delegating power at all.281 
The former delegations might be just as valid as express delegations, 
but the additional, “accidental” delegations might further enhance 
 
 274. Farina, supra note 38, at 487–88. 
 275. Id. at 497–98. 
 276. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 277. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. See Farina, supra note 38, at 468–76, 497–98 (discussing this problem). 
Siegel_Galley(Do Not Delete) 4/13/2018  9:16 AM 
2018] THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR CHEVRON 991 
executive power to the point where the balance between the branches 
is irretrievably upset. 
This argument does bring out a difficulty with Chevron doctrine. 
Chevron’s assumption that every ambiguity in an agency statute 
represents a congressional delegation of power to the agency is probably 
false. Congress does sometimes intentionally use broad or ambiguous 
language for the purpose of vesting authority in an agency,282 but 
statutory ambiguity also arises for other reasons.283 Allowing agencies 
to resolve ambiguities that accidentally arise enhances agency power. 
We could limit Chevron to cases in which a court determines that 
Congress deliberately, or at least not purely accidentally, used 
statutory ambiguity as a device to delegate authority, but such 
determinations would be very difficult for courts to make, as the 
legislative record might often provide no solid evidence as to the reason 
for a statutory ambiguity.284 This difficulty may underlie Chevron’s 
presumption that statutory ambiguity represents implicit delegation.285 
Three points help rescue Chevron from Farina’s suggestion that 
it violates the nondelegation doctrine. First, Farina’s argument is 
partly rooted in her doubt as to the accuracy of Chevron’s presumption 
about the likely reason for statutory ambiguity—she asserts that the 
Supreme Court had no basis for assuming that ambiguity represents 
implicit delegation.286 Congress could, however, address this part of the 
problem by passing the hypothetical CIA. If Congress provided by 
statute that ambiguity does represent implicit delegation, there would 
be no doubt that Congress desired Chevron deference in all cases of 
statutory ambiguity. 
Moreover, such an expression of congressional desire would 
narrow the set of cases where Chevron deference would do any more 
than express delegation. As noted above, to the extent that Chevron 
deference provides only an alternative vehicle for Congress to make 
delegations of authority that it could have made expressly, it should not 
 
 282. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 901, 995–97 (2013) (providing empirical evidence that congressional staff sometimes “quite 
intentional[ly]” draft ambiguous language for an agency to administer “because regulators have 
the expertise and things get worked out better by the agency” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 283. Id.; see also David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 212 (“Chevron doctrine at most can rely on a fictionalized statement of 
legislative desire . . . .”). 
 284. Farina, supra note 38, at 470; John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1911, 1950–51 (2015). 
 285. Farina, supra note 38, at 470. 
 286. Id. at 470–71. 
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matter from the standpoint of the nondelegation doctrine.287 Chevron 
provides agencies with genuine additional authority only to the extent 
that it creates situations where Congress is deemed to have delegated 
authority to agencies even though it did not intend to. But if Congress 
stated that it did intend every ambiguity in an agency statute as a 
delegation of authority, we would have Congress’s own assurance that 
its delegations via ambiguity were the equivalent of (and indeed under 
the CIA should be deemed to be rewritten as) express delegations. Both 
practically and legally that would likely result in fewer unintentional 
delegations than one might currently believe exist. 
Finally, even if some residue of unintentional delegations of 
authority might still exist in a world in which Congress has adopted the 
CIA, it seems unlikely that the additional authority thereby granted to 
agencies would make a decisive difference from the perspective of the 
nondelegation doctrine. As acknowledged above, such unintentional 
delegations do represent an additional accumulation of power within 
the executive. But the extra power involved pales in comparison to the 
amount delegated expressly. Congress has, with judicial approval, 
turned over broadcast policy to the FCC,288 the setting of prices to a 
Price Administrator,289 and the determination of what constitutes 
“unfair methods of competition” to the FTC.290 By comparison to these 
enormous powers, the additional power to choose among reasonable 
constructions of unintentionally ambiguous provisions of agency 
statutes seems small. To accept the enormous powers conferred 
expressly but to regard these additional powers as unconstitutional is 
to swallow the camel and strain at the gnat. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent constitutional attacks on Chevron are misdirected. 
Chevron does not wrest the interpretive power from courts and give it 
to the executive. Even accepting the critics’ claim that courts must 
exercise “independent judgment” when determining the meaning of 
statutes, Chevron does not prevent courts from exercising such 
judgment. Chevron does not prevent courts from fulfilling their duty to 
 
 287. See supra text accompanying notes 264, 276. 
 288. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943) (approving a statute 
authorizing the FCC to grant broadcast licenses on the basis of serving the “public interest”). 
 289. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427 (1944) (approving a statute authorizing a 
Price Administrator to fix commodities prices, provided that they be “fair and equitable”). 
 290. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 311–12 (7th Cir. 1919); see also A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 532–33 (1935) (distinguishing the FTC Act from a 
statute held to violate the nondelegation doctrine). 
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interpret statutes. An interpretation of a statute that concludes that 
the statute delegates power to an executive agency is still an 
interpretation. 
